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Abstract 
Tropical forest landscapes are subject to global conservation efforts as a source of public 
goods such as biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration, while at the same time they 
are often of great value for local livelihoods in poor rural areas in the developing world. 
Failure to reconcile conflicting global and local interests has led to situations where the costs 
of both forest loss and conservation are borne most heavily by those least able to afford them. 
Following the growing recognition of the trade-offs between conservation and development, 
conservation approaches have evolved from fully exclusionary approaches (i.e. protected 
areas) to approaches involving varying degrees of local participation in forest management, 
strengthening local ownership over forests, and efforts to mitigate livelihood losses or create 
social benefits from conservation. This study contributes to understanding how the positive 
and negative social impacts of different forest conservation approaches are distributed within 
forest adjacent communities, and what kind of forest governance practices may be associated 
with the observed outcomes.  
A mix of qualitative and quantitative social research methods was applied to assess the social 
performance of two forest conservation approaches implemented in the East Usambara 
Mountains, north-eastern Tanzania. The establishment of the Derema corridor was the focus 
of Studies I and II on the impacts and processes of compensated displacement from a forest 
protected area. Studies III and IV compared the outcomes and practices of Community-Based 
Forest Management (CBFM) to policy expectations of increased equity and effectiveness of 
forest management in the context of democratic decentralization.  
The results suggest that displacement from the Derema corridor contributed to local social 
differentiation. Negative impacts were most felt by women and the poorest segments of the 
affected communities, due to restricted access to production resources in the conserved area 
and failure to access the monetary compensation intended to compensate for the lost assets. A 
minority of better-off farmers emerged as relative winners of the process by accessing 
considerable compensation and investing in improved livelihoods. The outcomes were 
conditioned by the procedures followed, marked by unpreparedness and disruptions in the 
presence of the implementing agencies, as well as the limited agency of local actors, 
especially women, in the negotiations over the conditions of conservation and compensation. 
The limitations of monetary compensation for the taking of resource rights and subsequent 
implications for the design of rewards for forest conservation services are discussed.   
As a result of CBFM establishment, forest tenure security of local village communities has 
increased as per the policy expectations, but strict village forest rules preclude livelihood 
benefits. Some villagers have incurred costs from the establishment of village forest reserves 
through land appropriation. The outcomes of forest rights devolution in the East Usambaras 
may be seen as contextual path-dependent institutional reproduction that follows the previous 
exclusionary models of forest conservation, driven by civically and politically active village 
elites. Enhanced deliberative processes, access to accountability mechanisms, and increasing 
the awareness of procedural rights by all local stakeholders are central issues for improving 
the equity and sustainability of CBFM.   
Key words: forest, conservation, community, decentralization, governance, access, impact  
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Preface  
Through my previous training as a biologist, I became involved in conservation and 
enchanted by the beauty, diversity and ecological importance of tropical forests. As many 
others who studied in the 1990s following the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, I also believed that the people living adjacent to those forests were entitled to 
the same benefits from development, social equity and freedom that we were enjoying in my 
own country, and that such ‘win-wins’ for environment and development were possible to 
achieve. The first experiences in the field in the developing tropics were sobering, however, in 
terms of the myriad challenges related to coinciding the two in areas where international 
conservation interests and needs of the poor local population conflict. Since tropical forests 
have again gained prominence on the global policy agenda, especially in the international 
climate change negotiations, these concerns are more accentuated than ever. The social equity 
problems of forest conservation that have long intrigued me have been articulated as research 
questions and partially addressed in this PhD dissertation.  
This dissertation is dedicated to the inhabitants of the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania, 
who in their daily lives deal with the consequences of imperfect integration of conservation 
and local livelihoods in natural resource governance. I am particularly grateful to the villagers 
of Makanya, Antakae, Misalai, Shambangeda and Kwatango for their patience and trust in 
collaborating with this research, for repeatedly taking time off other chores to share their 
experiences with me and welcoming me to their homes, farms and forests. My special thanks 
go to Abduel Kajiru, whose professional and dedicated assistance in the field was 
instrumental for the achievement of the research objectives.  
In the course of the work I was supported by a number of individuals, colleagues and friends 
in various organizations and different parts of the world. The research was started while I 
worked in the ‘Landscape Mosaics’ research project by the World Agroforestry Centre 
(ICRAF) and the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR); I am indebted to my 
former supervisor Prof. Brent Swallow who gave me the push to start the PhD and guided me 
during the first shaky steps of this journey. Similar thanks go to Dr. Laura German for her 
persistent advice and contributions throughout. The support of other colleagues at ICRAF and 
CIFOR, as well as the material and administrative support of these organizations, was 
fundamental. I thank Peter Minang, Joyce Kasyoki, Catherine Kimengu, Vanessa Meadu, 
Jean-Marc Boffa and others in our GRP6-ASB group for the collegial atmosphere; Aichi 
Kitalyi, Mariam Haule and colleagues at the ICRAF Tanzania office for continued support to 
my field trips; Ric Coe and Peter Muraya for help in research design and data management; 
Jean-Laurent Pfund and Terry Sunderland for collaboration and the chance to spend three 
months at CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia, working on my data; Carol Colfer for advice and 
encouragement; Maria Brockhaus for the opportunity to continue building on my research in 
Tanzania, working with CIFOR; and other colleagues that I have not specifically mentioned. 
To the group of friends and colleagues that I came to know through research in the East 
Usambaras: thank you Heini Vihemäki, Emmanuel Lyimo, Jaclyn Hall, Renee Bullock, 
Bronwen Powell and Mwilla Mbegu for sharing the experience and keeping up the spirit. I 
also wish to thank colleagues in the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, WWF and Muheza 
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district, especially Charles Meshack, Nike Doggart, Boniface Mtui, George Jambiya and Neil 
Burgess. I am grateful to the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) 
for repeatedly permitting my work in Tanzania. Support from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland to my work as an Associate Expert at ICRAF, as well as the funding from the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation to the Landscape Mosaics project, is 
gratefully acknowledged.  
Both the Viikki Tropical Resources Institute (VITRI) and the discipline of Development 
Studies in the Department of Political and Economic Studies provided me an academic home 
at the University of Helsinki. Prof. (Emeritus) Olavi Luukkanen opened me the door to 
VITRI, and Prof. Markku Kanninen guided me through the last stages of the PhD process as 
the main academic supervisor. I am grateful to Prof. (Emeritus) Juhani Koponen for his 
contributions throughout the research process and for inviting me to the Development Studies 
group while I was in Helsinki in 2010-2011. Suggestions and comments by Prof. Koponen 
and the participants of the Development Studies PhD seminar were helpful in the 
development of the original research articles. Comments by two external reviewers of this 
dissertation are also gratefully acknowledged.  
The last efforts of writing and finalizing the dissertation took place while I was a research 
fellow in the Sustainability Science Program in the Harvard Kennedy School during the 
academic year 2011-2012. I am indebted to Prof. Bill Clark and Nancy Dickson for this 
valuable experience and the important intellectual as well as material support to my work. The 
collegial support of the Sustainability Science fellows helped me through the final push; 
Angelica, Eben, Chico, Ram, Nazia and others – thank you for everything. The year at 
Harvard was made possible by grants from the Fulbright Center and the Finnish Cultural 
Foundation.  
Last but not least, I wish to acknowledge the support of my family and all other friends not 
yet mentioned, such as my dear friends in Nairobi, Kenya, “who never knew me not working 
on a PhD” (that’s you Brian Harding). I have no words to express my gratitude to my parents 
for all their love and encouragement. Osku, thank you for bearing with me and standing by 
me in the final stressful moments. The second dedication of this dissertation goes to my 
grandparents Sirkka and Aulis Rantala – I am sorry I took too long to graduate for you to see 
it; I miss you deeply.       
 
Helsinki, January 2013 
Salla Rantala 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Tropical forests, conservation, and livelihoods: the big picture  
Twenty years ago, the UN conference in Rio de Janeiro drew the world’s attention to the 
critical state of the ecosystems on our planet, and started global policy processes to address 
species loss, climate change, and desertification. At the centre of these efforts lies the 
conservation of tropical forests, home to some of the richest biodiversity on earth, and 
supporting a variety of ecosystem functions increasingly considered crucial for the survival of 
our own species. Although global estimates of volumes and values remain crude, it is safe to 
say that tropical forests are nearly unmatched among the world’s biomes in terms of 
supporting climate regulation, carbon storage and sequestration, hydrological cycles and soil 
erosion control, in addition to their long-recognized benefits as a source of food, fuel, 
medicine, timber and other raw materials (Costanza et al. 1997, Sunderlin et al. 2005, Naidoo 
et al. 2008).  
The role of forests for food security, human health, fuel, and shelter is most pronounced in 
poor rural areas in the developing world (Colfer et al. 2006, Arnold et al. 2011). Since poverty 
reduction was elevated to the top of the world’s policy agenda with the adoption of the 
Millenium Development Goals in 2002, policy and academic debates have been marked by an 
increasing awareness of the intricate relationship between the dual objectives of tackling 
poverty and conserving the environment. Agricultural expansion and economic growth have 
benefited billions of people, but have been closely associated with forest conversion and loss 
(Sunderlin et al. 2005, CBD 2010), currently advancing at a rate of 13 million hectares per 
year (FAO 2010a) and accounting for up to 12-20% of total CO2 emissions (Van der Werf et 
al. 2009). Establishment of protected areas, the core approach to conserving the world’s 
forests, has involved different degrees of exclusion of local people from resource access, 
bearing the risk of economic and social marginalization of forest-adjacent communities 
(Brockington and Igoe 2006, Sunderland et al. 2007). Failures to reconcile conflicting global 
and local interests in forest management has led to situations where the costs of both forest 
loss and conservation are borne most heavily by those least able to afford them.  
The realization that not all forests and their people are equal adds several layers of complexity 
to the challenge. If there are often trade-offs between conservation and development, 
coinciding various forest conservation goals may also pose challenges. Optimal forest 
composition and spatial targeting of conservation activities may vary depending on whether 
the aim is to maximize biodiversity benefits or other ecosystem services (Chan et al. 2006, 
Naidoo et al. 2008). Different parts of a forest landscape perform different functions for local 
inhabitants (Sassen and Jum 2007, Pfund et al. 2011) and for different groups among those 
inhabitants, considering, for example, the needs of forest dependent hunter-gatherers versus 
agricultural frontier migrants (Sunderlin et al. 2005). Forest tenure conditions vary 
tremendously. Although over 80% of the world’s forests remain officially under ‘public’ 
(government) ownership (FAO 2010a), forests are often subject to multiple overlapping 
claims. While lacking the authority and resources to effectively manage vast forest areas in 
the developing tropics, governments often fail to recognize customary access, use, and 
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management rights of local communities. Other entities de facto managing public forests 
include private companies through timber concessions and conservation organizations (White 
and Martin 2005, Agrawal et al. 2008). How an area becomes defined as forest in the first 
place, or not, depends largely on national circumstances (Sasaki and Putz 2009). Furthermore, 
with the advance of climate change, currently defined biogeographic forest boundaries are 
likely to shift in the future. Against this background, it appears clear that a diverse portfolio of 
governance instruments is required to effectively and equitably address both local and global 
interests in tropical forest management in dynamic contexts.  
1.2. Forest conservation paradigms 
The establishment of protected areas has long prevailed as the main governance instrument to 
sustain the stocks, environmental services and biodiversity of the world’s tropical forests. In 
many tropical countries, protected areas, or forest reserves, date back to the arrival of 
European colonizers who aimed to secure natural resources to serve the development of their 
country of origin, often closing up forests from local inhabitants (cf. Woodcock 2002, 
Neumann 2004). This exclusionary approach has dominated global biodiversity conservation 
efforts until recently, stemming from a now largely refuted idea of pristine, equilibrium 
ecosystems that can only be preserved if entirely segregated from human presence and use 
(e.g. Adams and Hutton 2007). It is still seen as an essential part of the management tool box 
for sustaining the world’s tropical forests (cf. Aichi Targets, CBD 2010, 
http://www.cbd.int/sp/), especially in relation to the growing interest in harnessing forests for 
climate change mitigation (e.g. Angelsen et al. 2009). Currently, officially protected areas 
such as national parks, game reserves and wilderness areas cover around 13% of the world’s 
forested area; in the tropics of Asia, Africa and South America the proportion is higher (13-
24%) than in Europe (4%) or North America (10%). Globally, the area of forest within 
protected areas has grown by 94 million hectares, at an average rate of 1.5% per year, since 
1990 (FAO 2010a).   
While the effectiveness of the world’s protected area coverage in attaining the expected 
conservation goals is debated (Bruner et al. 2001, Chape et al. 2005, Hayes 2006, Campbell et 
al. 2008, Laurance et al. 2012), it is the equity side of things – the human impacts – that most 
criticism concerning exclusionary conservation has been directed at in policy and academic 
discussions in recent decades. Longer strands of discussion that had started to identify 
discomfort in the relationship between conservation and local livelihoods came to a head in 
the early 2000s, the period after which has been marked by a proliferation of studies, policy 
revision and contentious debates between conservationists and social scientists regarding the 
trade-offs between conservation and development (Adams et al. 2004, Brockington et al. 
2006, West et al. 2006, Sunderland et al. 2007, Roe 2008, Agrawal and Redford 2009). 
Attention has been drawn to such negative human impacts of exclusionary conservation as the 
opportunity costs of forest protected areas as opposed to extractive and production land uses, 
human-wildlife conflict, and direct marginalization and impoverishment of local people due 
to displacement from protected areas (e.g. Brockington and Igoe 2006, Cernea and Schmidt-
Soltau 2006, West et al. 2006, Coad et al. 2008, Agrawal and Redford 2009, Lasgorceix and 
Kothari 2009). The debates on the  “purported or real” negative human impacts of protected 
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areas (Curran et al. 2009, Schmidt-Soltau 2009) have coincided with increasing attention to 
human rights in development and conservation, encompassing not only property rights but 
also procedural rights to participation and decision making (Campese 2009). These 
developments  link to previous discussions concerning disenfranchisement of local people 
first by colonizers, then transnational conservation actors (Adams and Hutton 2007, Roe 
2008), as well as conservation failures due to lack of local support (e.g. Ghimire and Pimbert 
1997, Hulme and Murphree 2001 - but see Brockington 2003). 
Although sometimes deemed an unproductive distraction from real efforts to reconcile 
conservation and livelihood needs (Brockington et al. 2006, Sunderland et al. 2007), the 
academic and policy debates have undoubtedly contributed to the evolution from fully 
exclusionary conservation approaches to approaches involving varying degrees of local 
participation in forest management and efforts to mitigate livelihood losses or create social 
benefits from conservation.  
Among the first of these efforts were Integrated Conservation and Development Projects 
(ICDPs) in the 1980s-90s, in principle offering community development projects in exchange 
for conservation compliance. Widely criticized for falling short of delivering either 
conservation or development benefits (Kremen et al. 1994, Newmark and Hough 2000, 
Chapin 2004, Christensen 2004), the lessons from ICDPs did in turn influence further 
evolution of forest conservation approaches. Disenchantment with community conservation 
based on the early experience (Agrawal and Gibson 1999) led to calls for a re-evaluation of 
the role of exclusionary protected areas as the primary means of conserving tropical 
biodiversity (e.g. Brandon et al. 1998, Oates 1999), while some turned their attention to the 
development of market-based conservation mechanisms. Direct payments for conservation 
services between buyers (e.g., the international community) and sellers (e.g., local forest-
adjacent communities) have been suggested to work better than indirect approaches such as 
the ICDPs (Ferraro and Kiss 2002). The idea of rewards conditional upon the delivery of 
conservation outcomes has since developed into a growing field of Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) (cf. Wunder 2006, Engel et al. 2008, Swallow et al. 2009), 
including, most recently, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation or 
REDD+  (e.g. Angelsen 2008, Angelsen et al. 2009, 2012).        
A number of international organizations that support conservation have also adopted 
principles, policies, and programmes addressing local people’s rights and redress mechanisms 
in conservation-related displacement or restricted access to resources. Policies of international 
finance institutions and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank or the OECD 
specifically call for timely, adequate, and fair compensation for assets lost in conservation 
interventions (Cernea 2005, Siegele et al. 2009). Conceptually, compensation for 
conservation-related displacement differs from PES in usually being one-off rather than 
several conditional payments extending over a long period of conservation services delivery, 
and in being compensation for the permanent taking of resource rights that are formally re-
allocated to a new rights holder, such as the national government in the case of state protected 
areas.   
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Criticism of the ICDPs by social scientists for failing because of being only superficially 
participatory and a continuation of top-down resource governance (Neumann 1997, Chapin 
2004) coincided with an increasing emphasis on local participation in development theory and 
structural adjustment policies aiming at deregulation and decentralization since the 1980s 
(Roe 2008, cf. Chambers 1983, 1997), leading to further efforts to strengthen local ownership 
over forests. The feared resurgence of exclusionary conservation (Wilshusen et al. 2002) 
turned out to be short-lived at least in the forest sector, as a wave of decentralization of forest 
governance continued to sweep across many developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America (Colfer et al. 2008, German et al. 2010, Larson et al. 2010). The forest tenure reform 
(Larson et al. 2010) has ranged in different countries from the deconcentration of forest 
management powers from centralized state agencies to their sub-national branches, to 
democratic decentralization or devolution of bundles of forest rights to downwardly 
accountable local authorities, including those directly representing local forest adjacent 
communities (Agrawal and Ribot 2000, Ribot 2002). The decentralization processes have 
been driven by expectations of increased effectiveness of forest governance following decades 
of inefficient state forest management in many developing countries, and more equitable 
creation and distribution of benefits from forests, ultimately contributing to poverty reduction 
(e.g. URT 1998a, 2005).  Internalizing externalities by assigning local owners or custodians 
to more forests is hoped to increase resource management effectiveness. Local coordination, 
knowledge, and labour may lower transaction costs and increase management efficiency. 
Bringing decision makers and arenas for decision making closer to constituents is expected to 
help better match the needs and aspirations of local people to resource management goals and 
implementation, making decisions more legitimate and more relevant to those whose lives 
they concern, in turn enhancing sustainability (Agrawal and Ribot 2000, Ribot 2002, Crook 
2003, Smoke 2003). 
As any paradigm, decentralized forest management has been met with as much caution and 
scrutiny as hope, especially in terms of its potential to result in sustainable forest conservation 
outcomes. Would enhanced formal forest access not result in forest clearance which is likely 
to offer quicker livelihood returns (e.g. Tacconi 2007)? Recently, a decade or two into the 
implementation of forest tenure reforms in many countries, assessments of the outcomes of 
forest decentralization have started to emerge. Large-N assessments based on quantitative 
data from various tropical countries appear to support the rationale of increased management 
effectiveness following decentralization: the security of community forest rights and local 
autonomy of rulemaking has been shown to be associated with effective conservation of 
forest biodiversity and carbon stocks (Chhatre and Agrawal 2009, Nelson and Chomitz 2011, 
Persha et al. 2011). Results regarding the local livelihood benefits and poverty reduction 
potential of forest decentralization have been mixed, and among case studies, frustration 
appears to outnumber success (Ribot et al. 2010). In their comparative study of 84 community 
forestry sites in six countries in East Africa and South Asia, Persha et al. (2011) found that 
60% of the cases were characterized by trade-off relationships between biodiversity and 
livelihood outcomes, although jointly positive outcomes were more common (27%) than 
mutually negative cases (13%). In the aggregate, ‘win-win’ outcomes were strongly correlated 
with local rulemaking autonomy, supporting the assertion that a large number of cases in 
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which forest decentralization had failed to deliver the expected benefits could be attributable 
to incomplete or non-establishment of democratic decentralization (Ribot et al. 2010).    
As different forest conservation approaches are developed and implemented, there has been 
relatively little empirical assessment in terms of which conservation approach brings the 
greatest social benefit or minimizes negative social impacts in specific social-ecological 
settings that vary a great deal across the tropics, within countries and across regions. The 
acknowledgement that forest conservation is always implemented within and conditioned by 
the complex reality of dynamic context-specific social-ecological systems has made some 
scholars wary of a small set of simple models or ‘policy panaceas’, such as protected areas or 
community-based forest management, as potential ‘one size fits all’ solutions. The models 
may come up short when confronted with the realities of particular cases, and it often cannot 
be prescribed up-front which approach – or a mix of them – would be optimal (Berkes 2007, 
Brock and Carpenter 2007, Ostrom et al. 2007). Still, most researchers tend to look at one 
forest conservation approach at the time when assessing their ecological or social 
performance in a certain context (but see e.g. Nagendra 2002, Persha and Blomley 2009).  
A related concern is that studies striving to establish simple causality relationships between 
the different policy models and social and ecological outcomes of forest conservation often 
suffer from an under-conceptualization of the processes and factors that mediate outcomes, or 
apply relatively simplified understandings of the key social and ecological concepts (Leach et 
al. 1999, Wilshusen et al. 2002, Parkins and Mitchell 2005). For instance, the observation that 
communities that are affected by or participate in forest conservation consist of heterogeneous 
groups of actors, with important implications for the equity and effectiveness outcomes, made 
its way into the academic and policy debate early on (e.g. Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Still, 
policy documents and every day practices of forest governance continue to be rife with 
references to ‘local communities’, often aggregating them as a single stakeholder. The 
implications of the differences between local actors in terms of their social identities, 
resources, and livelihood strategies, as well as their relationships and roles regarding forests, 
still require further attention if the social and ecological performance of the various forest 
conservation approaches is to be convincingly assessed.   
1.3. Research objectives  
The studies that form this dissertation were focused on two conservation approaches 
implemented in the same forest landscape in northeastern Tanzania, characterized by strong 
international interests in protecting the endemic biodiversity of the forests and conflicting 
local needs to use the forest and land for livelihoods. The establishment of a new forest 
protected area, involving the displacement of local farmers and monetary compensation for 
lost assets, and Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM), in which village 
communities continued to manage forests on their own land, were assessed in terms of their 
social impacts and associated governance processes. A specific focus was on the distribution 
of positive and negative livelihood impacts among different social groups among the affected 
populations. Formal policies guiding the implementation of these conservation approaches 
were compared to the actual governance practices within the intervention contexts in order to 
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identify explaining factors that conditioned the processes leading to the observed outcomes. 
Figure 1 illustrates the foci of the four sub-studies and how they were related in a quadrate of 
objectives.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The foci of the four sub-studies that aimed to assess the social outcomes of forest 
protected area establishment and Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) as well as 
to explain the governance processes that shaped the observed outcomes. 
 
The general objective of the research was to inform the further design of forest conservation 
approaches so that they would more equitably and effectively reconcile local livelihood needs 
with conservation goals. The specific objectives were to 
(1) Identify the social impacts of compensated displacement from a forest 
protected area, the intra-community distribution of the impacts among social 
groups characterised by gender and wealth, and the opportunities for successful 
post-conservation livelihood rehabilitation by the different groups (Study I).  
(2) Understand how governance factors such as relevant institutional structures 
and the involved actors’ agency conditioned the social outcomes of the 
conservation and compensation intervention (Study II). 
(3) Assess how the policy expectations of democratic decentralization and 
associated livelihood benefits compare against the outcomes of Community-
Based Forest Management (CBFM) in the East Usambara Mountains (Study 
III). 
(4) Examine the intra-community processes of CBFM establishment to explain 
how local social and political dynamics have mediated the observed CBFM 
outcomes in terms of legitimacy, equity and effectiveness (Study IV).       
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The theoretical and conceptual framework of the study is presented in Chapter 2. The study 
context, including the broader institutional framework for forest governance in Tanzania, as 
well as the social-ecological context of the study site of the East Usambara Mountains, is 
described in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 also includes a description of the research methods used. 
The results of the different sub-studies are summarized in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the 
implications of the findings for efforts to develop forest conservation approaches that would 
more equitably address local livelihood needs in forest adjacent communities.   
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2. Theoretical framework  
2.1. Conservation processes in complex social-ecological systems 
An important underpinning for this study is the notion of tropical forest landscapes as 
complex social-ecological systems (Berkes and Folke 1998, or 'coupled human-
environment systems', Turner et al. 2003) with various context-specific, interlinked, cross-
scale and dynamic biophysical and social dimensions. This complexity means that it is 
practically impossible to establish linear causality relationships between a single conservation 
intervention1 and social and ecological outcomes, or to develop models for action that would 
unfailingly produce equitable and effective outcomes. It has been suggested that in diagnosing 
multi-dimensional conservation and development problems, the analysis should be focused on 
identifying variables or attributes of a problem thought to be essential in the particular 
problem context, different interactions between these variables, changes triggered, and 
patterns of outcomes. Such an approach can maximize learning from the often surprising 
outcomes of those interactions (cf. Ostrom et al. 2007, Preskill 2009).  
Hence, the current study grounds the assessment of forest conservation approaches in the 
context where they are being implemented, while at the same time linking them to theoretical 
models that can inform policy processes at multiple levels. Figure 2 presents a stylized model 
of the key concepts used in the analysis and their posited interrelationships based on current 
theory and literature. The theoretical framework of the study has been informed by bodies of 
literature on sustainable rural livelihoods, property theory and legal anthropology, democratic 
decentralization of natural resource governance, and deliberative governance.    
                                                      
1 Intervention refers to activities or measures that are initiated to trigger a process to achieve a certain objective 
or set of objectives (Koponen 2004: 6), such as conservation goals. 
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Figure 2. A model of the key concepts and their interrelationships for analysing social change 
processes triggered by forest conservation interventions (modified based on Figure 1 in Study 
I).  
Study I applies the posited interrelationships of Figure 2 to analyse local livelihood outcomes 
following displacement from a protected area, and changes in access to resources and 
livelihood strategies. Yet, Figure 2 should not be understood as an attempt to capture linear 
change processes from a conservation intervention to livelihood outcomes, but analysis may 
be focused on the different parts and pathways of the conceptual model depending on the 
focus of interest – all the while it should be kept in mind that the proposed model, as any 
other, is an imperfect simplification of the various processes that may occur. Studies II and IV 
draw from the same conceptual framework in analysing the political dimensions of 
conservation processes, focusing on the interactions between relational structures (social 
capital), human agency, and institutions. In the following sections, the key concepts and their 
various theoretical linkages are defined and discussed.    
2.2. Access: a function of rights and agency 
Access to resources, such as forest and land, is a key factor shaping rural livelihood strategies 
and outcomes (Scoones 1998). In theorizing access, the current study follows 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) in defining it as the actual ability of actors to benefit from the 
resources at stake. The means and processes enabling access may be analysed separately.  
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Property rights, or tenure (Ribot and Peluso 2003), form an important component of access, 
indicating different types of social claims that authorize their holder to use, manage, and 
benefit from resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003, Sikor and Lund 2009). They only exist when 
there are institutions such as rules, norms, and conventions that define the relationship 
between rights holders and all others who must bear the duty of respecting the rights 
(Bromley 1991). Individuals and groups do not always hold a complete set of well-defined 
rights; rather they may possess varying bundles of rights, including the rights of access2, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). The nature 
and characteristics of the bundles of rights as well as their security (including duration of 
rights) condition the claims of individuals and groups to resources and, as proposed by 
institutional economists, shape their incentives and actions in natural resource management, 
including investing in and maintaining the resources (Bromley 1991, Schlager and Ostrom 
1992, Wiebe and Meinzen-Dick 1998).  
Depending on whose hands the bundles of rights have been consolidated in, property rights 
regimes may be defined as private property, state property or common property. As opposed 
to private property held by individuals or corporations, a common property regime is 
characterized by a group of individuals holding rights to a resource in common. Often, the 
management authority is consolidated in the leaders or selected representatives of the group 
(Berkes and Farvar 1989, Bromley 1991). Following Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” 
(1968), common property regimes have been frequently confused with open access which, 
conceptually, refers to a situation in which there are no well-defined, socially acknowledged 
rights or rights holders, and resources are ‘free’ to be depleted by those who first get to them 
(Berkes 1989, Bromley 1991). The conceptual difference is important. While scholars have 
strived to identify conditions under which private property, state property or common 
property regimes may be sustainable (cf. Ostrom 1990, Wiebe and Meinzen-
Dick 1998, Agrawal 2001), any of these regimes may become open access, and unsustainable, 
if broken down and not enforced (Bromley 1991). Such situations are frequent in the 
developing tropics when the capacities of the state to manage formally state-owned forest 
areas are not sufficient, or the state does not recognize common property regimes based on 
customary rules, making it difficult for local communities to exercise exclusion.  
The differential recognition of rights based on statutory law, on the one hand, and those based 
on customary rules or practices3, on the other, has been variously framed by scholars who 
recognize its important implications for access. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) refer to de jure 
rights, given lawful recognition by state authorities, and de facto rights that originate among 
resource users and are less secure than de jure rights until eventually recognized in judiciary 
settings. Locally originated rights, when formally recognized by different government levels 
and bound to a national legal framework (for example, rights defined by local forest bylaws 
formulated within a national policy framework) may also be considered de jure rights. When 
                                                      
2 In Schlager and Ostrom's (1992) conceptualization, ‘access’ means mere entry to a physical property; not to be 
confused with the broader definition of access central to this study. 
3 Defined here as self-organized rule systems rooted in the social experiences and shared histories of 
communities (Benjamin 2008). 
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formal rights exist, but other patterns of rights are followed in practice, the latter are 
considered de facto. Examples include non-application of national laws, informal access 
rights granted by government agencies to protected areas to ensure good relations with 
adjacent communities, and corruption and mismanagement in the allocation of rights.  
Other scholars describe a situation where various legal orders exist independently, or are 
mutually ignored, as legal pluralism. Legal constellations conditioning rights include not only 
statutory and customary laws, but also, for instance, religious laws, international conventions, 
and institutionalized rules and practices of organizations and projects. These often exist in 
overlapping social domains (Griffiths 2002, Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). Legal 
pluralism is widespread in many post-colonial countries where local customary laws were 
first subordinated to the laws imposed by the colonizers, and the sovereignty of the state law 
was reinforced after independence. Yet, customary rules often continued to be followed 
locally. In some cases, they were recognized by and codified in the state law, sometimes 
involving reinterpretation or simplification of what customary law was (Griffiths 2002, 
Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). The decentralization processes in various countries have 
allowed the creation of new community-based institutions that in some cases have been 
designed by external agents and implemented at the local level (Benjamin 2008). The 
relationship between customary and modern decentralized institutions may range from 
ignorance to subordination to effective accommodation (Marfo et al. 2010).     
Legal pluralist scholars stress that the various normative orders may co-exist at different 
levels with their own bases of validity and legitimacy, independently of state recognition 
(Griffiths 2002, von Benda-Beckmann 2002). An important observation is that actors may 
flexibly draw from different legal orders, depending on the situation, as the basis of their 
claims to a resource. These dynamics have been called “forum shopping” (von Benda-
Beckmann 1981). In addition to the selective use of law, (re-)invention of custom has been 
documented as another way for actors to manipulate the discrepancies between various 
normative orders to promote their interests (Wiber 1990, Yngstrom 2002, Whitehead and 
Tsikata 2003).   
The notion that property rights are dynamic and frequently challenged and re-created by 
actors in struggles for access (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002, Whitehead and Tsikata 2003, 
Nygren 2004), supports Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) conceptualization of access as more akin to 
a bundle of powers than a bundle of rights. Communities, such as those affected by or 
involved in forest conservation, are not static, rule-bound entities but consist of actors who 
actively observe, interpret and shape the world around them (Leach et al. 1999). They may 
strategically draw from their bundles of powers to promote their interests in claiming, 
controlling, and maintaining access to given resources. The strands in the bundles of powers 
are conditioned by the resources at the actors’ disposal, including knowledge, authority, social 
identities, and social relations (Ribot and Peluso 2003). They constitute various intermingled 
constellations of rights-based and other means and processes to gain and maintain benefit 
streams, with varying bases of legitimacy (cf. Sikor and Lund 2009). It is worth paying close 
attention to the use of the concept of ‘illegal access’. Following the legal pluralist perspective, 
it refers not only to enjoyment of benefits through ways that are not socially sanctioned by 
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law, but also through ways contradicting custom, convention or any institutionalized set of 
rules followed by a collectivity (cf. Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). Because the different 
types of rules are recognized to varying degrees by different actors, illegal access is not easily 
pitted against rights-based access as the polar opposite, as suggested by Ribot and Peluso 
(2003: 164), but needs to be carefully defined in each context.  
Ribot and Peluso (2003: 164) also separate out “structural and relational mechanisms” of 
access, some of which in the current framework may be considered as part of the resources 
underlying bundles of powers (e.g. technology, monetary capital, labour; knowledge as part of 
human capital; and social identities and relations as part of social capital; Figure 2). Others, 
such as markets, are seen in this study as pertaining to the broader contextual framework 
conditioning access, including also the historical, policy and biophysical context (Figure 2; 
cf. Scoones 1998, 2009). Although different conceptual models variously organize the 
components of access, their interdependencies and mutual influences in dynamic contexts are 
usually emphasized (Ribot and Peluso 2003, Sikor and Lund 2009). That is, similar 
observations of dynamism concern bundles of powers as bundles of rights. They may shift 
over time, and change forms of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 154). 
2.3. Agency, inequality and gendered access 
To investigate the effect of human agency on forest conservation processes and outcomes, this 
study pays attention to the various strategies through which the bundles of powers may be 
operationalized in struggles for access, such as negotiation, bargaining, coercion – including 
discursive means – and sometimes also more hidden ways of action, such as non-cooperation 
or non-compliance (cf. Scott 1985, Ribot and Peluso 2003). A central observation for a study 
concerned with equity is that these struggles are usually shaped by largely unequal conditions 
for different actors to promote their interests regarding resources (e.g. Nygren 2004). There is 
always likely to be differences in the bundles of powers that different actors possess, 
conditioned not only by the structures and relations between rural communities and 
‘outsiders’ that are often perceived more powerful (e.g. the state,  Scott 1985), but also within 
the ‘communities’. A growing number of studies looking into local natural resource 
management within communities find sub-groups, and then individuals within these 
subgroups, with varying preferences in and access to resource use and distribution (Agrawal 
and Gibson 1999). Attributes of social identity that may have significant implications for 
access include, for instance, age, gender, ethnicity, religion, status, caste, and profession (e.g. 
Ribot and Peluso 2003: 171, Agarwal 2010: 4). 
At the sub-community level, studies on the outcomes of natural resource governance have 
commonly focused on households as the unit of analysis.  A conventional conception of a 
household depicts it as a social unit which, in addition to consisting of individuals that usually 
reside under the same roof and share meals, acts in concert to decide over resource allocation 
and income pooling (cf. Ellis 2000: 18). Although it is acknowledged that households are sites 
of particularly intense social and economic interactions and interdependencies between 
individuals, the above conception does not always fully match the reality (Bruce 1989, Ellis 
2000, Yngstrom 2002, Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Some scholars suggest that kinship ties 
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are more important than cohabitance, with family members frequently residing elsewhere but 
remitting important contributions to the household. But family, often extended, is similarly 
complicated to define as a unit of analysis. Moreover, neighbourly, friendship, religious, and 
other ties within communities may be more important for the livelihoods of some actors than 
family ties (cf. Ellis 2000: 18).  
A significant body of literature concerns the role of gender for access to land and other 
resources, especially in terms of how actor gender affects struggles for access in everyday 
practices of resource management. The mainstream conception of household as the unit of 
economic decisions has been argued to subordinate women as wives, sisters, daughters and 
widows to the decisions of ‘household heads’ in matters of resource allocation and 
livelihoods, with important implications for the findings of studies using such an approach 
and subsequently the way they inform policies, for example the practices of registering rural 
landholding (cf. Gray and Kevane 1999, Yngstrom 2002). Yet, the picture emerging from 
empirical studies is much more nuanced (cf. Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997), supporting the 
multi-faceted conceptualization of access underpinning the current study. For instance, there 
is evidence that the social embeddedness of women’s land access in sub-Saharan Africa may 
work to either weaken or to strengthen gendered land claims, depending on the context and 
the dynamic bundles of powers that condition actors’ agency (Gray and Kevane 1999, 
Yngstrom 2002, Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). In some cases, formal land titling processes 
have weakened women’s access as their claims have been bypassed to the advantage of male 
household heads or other powerful local actors (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997). These processes are 
likely to have been conditioned by previous gendered contestations and insecurity over land, 
resulting from differentiated positions which genders occupy within kinship systems that 
function as the primary organizing order for land access in some customary systems 
(Yngstrom 2002: 25, Whitehead and Tsikata 2003: 77). At the same time, the same systems 
may have provided women with diverse, complementary or alternative means to access land. 
Marriage is an important site of access, but women often also retain some residual land claims 
in their own kin groups as well as frequently obtaining land by loan, gift or purchase through 
a wider circle of social ties (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003: 78, cf. Woodcock 2002, Rantala 
and Lyimo 2011).  An important reservation concerns the analysis of forest access using 
conceptions of property based on land. In some systems rights to land and trees correlate, 
such as in the customary practices of the Shambaa of the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania 
(Woodcock 2002). In others, complex nested resource tenure systems may be found, with 
important implications for gendered access to forest and trees (Rocheleau and Edmunds 
1997).    
Studies have also paid attention to gendered exclusions in formal processes of forest 
governance in decentralized systems, and have found that they compound women’s 
marginalization regarding resource access (e.g. Agarwal 2001, Bandiaky and Tiani 2010, 
Bandiaky-Badji 2011). Much less attention has been paid to the impact of women’s presence 
on the outcomes for forest conservation and local livelihoods when they do participate (but 
see Agarwal 2010).  
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2.4. Inequality and forest collective action 
In addition to equity in resource access and social outcomes, the effect of inequality on the 
effectiveness and sustainability of forest management has piqued the interest of scholars. So 
far, no easy correspondence between inequality and success of collective action (Baland and 
Platteau 1999, 2007, Varughese and Ostrom 2001, Poteete and Ostrom 2004), or between 
social homogeneity and sustainable resource use (Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 635) has been 
found. Studies that have attempted to identify these relationships have varied in the dimension 
of actor heterogeneity measured, the type of collective action considered, the criteria for 
success or sustainability, as well as the study context. Moreover, contrasting results have been 
interpreted and explained in varying ways, and often reverse causality cannot be ruled out 
(Poteete and Ostrom 2004, Baland and Platteau 2007).  
Olson's (1965) ideas have been influential in proposing that a certain type of heterogeneity 
may be conducive for collective action if there is a small group or “critical mass” (Oliver et 
al. 1985) of better endowed actors within a community that bear the cost of initiating and 
maintaining collective action, such as community-based forest management. Wealthier users 
may be better able bear these costs, the time and other resources devoted to collectively 
organizing regulation and its proper implementation, including monitoring and sanctioning 
activities, dispute settlement, and rule revision. There is usually a minimum level of aggregate 
effort that has to be put in so that the desired management objectives can be achieved (Baland 
and Platteau 2007: 25).  
Although economists have emphasized the existence of an economic elite that initiates 
collective action (cf. Olson 1965, Baland and Platteau 1999, 2007), this study draws attention 
to the implications of various types of heterogeneity that may exist within communities, 
following the multifaceted conception of access. Oliver et al. (1985) stress the importance of 
social relations for individual decisions to contribute to collective action. Social ties may 
provide opportunities for multiple incentives to participate in community forest management, 
overriding immediate individual economic constraints (cf. Marwell et al. 1988). Moreover, 
there is likely to be heterogeneity of interests regarding the resource (Ostrom 1990), which 
may complicate the achievement of collective action if the interests of users differ 
substantially (Varughese and Ostrom 2001).  The nature and extent of women and men’s 
interests regarding forests may be distinct (Agarwal 2010). The time horizons of resource 
interests of actors may similarly differ, favouring distinct action (e.g. prompt exploitation vs. 
deferred use, Baland and Platteau 1999). There may be variation in the availability of 
alternate sources of resources to different actors (Varughese and Ostrom 2001: 749) as well as 
locational differences, i.e. distances of different users from the resource, which may also 
affect their interests and motivation (Varughese and Ostrom 2001, Poteete and Ostrom 2004).  
Varughese and Ostrom (2001) suggest that the probability of resource users to self-organize – 
to establish and sustainably maintain institutions that specify rights and duties with regard to a 
common good (Ostrom 1990) – in the case of socially heterogeneous groups is conditioned by 
authority, trust, interpretation of rules, and reciprocity among the group members. In practice, 
the responsibility to enforce rules is often vested in a local authority, such as a local 
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government or a village natural resource committee, on behalf of all users. These observations 
draw attention to another dimension of heterogeneity that may have implications for 
collective action, as suggested by Vedeld (2000: 108): political heterogeneity, or the degree of 
agreement on the legitimacy of leaders and institutions.    
Varughese and Ostrom (2001) and Poteete and Ostrom (2004) further state that although 
heterogeneities may pose challenges for collective action, these may be overcome by 
appropriate institutional design. This suggests that the processes through which community 
forestry institutions are established are of crucial importance for the sustainability of regimes. 
The autonomy of rulemaking is increasingly agreed to be a determining characteristic for the 
outcomes of these processes (Ostrom 1990, Persha et al. 2011). This study also pays close 
attention to the legitimatizing practices in institution formation and constitution of authority 
(cf. Sikor and Lund 2009).  
2.5. Forest governance and the constitution of legitimacy 
Various conceptions of legitimacy have been put forth in relation to different types of 
governance regimes, and scholars only appear to agree on it being a multifaceted concept (cf. 
Dogan 1992, Kronsell and Bäckstrand 2010). At the broadest level, what may be called 
political legitimacy refers to the acceptance of and the authority granted to particular social 
structures by a specific community. A specific form of legitimacy that this study is concerned 
with, normative legitimacy, relates to governance as it conforms to the values, norms and 
principles of the community. In liberal democracy, such principles may include transparency, 
rule of law, fairness, inclusion, participation, representation and deliberation (Scharpf 1999, 
Kronsell and Bäckstrand 2010). Institutions do not automatically embody legitimacy, but it 
has to be established. Hence, what is considered legitimate varies between and within cultures 
and over time, and is continuously (re-)established through conflict and negotiation. Drawing 
from their bundles of powers, actors actively employ different concepts in their attempts to 
legitimate various political interests and initiatives (cf. Sikor and Lund 2009: 7).  
In evaluating the processes through which new forestry regimes are created, this study 
borrows from Scharpf (1999) who suggests examining the legitimacy of political processes 
through breaking the concept down to input legitimacy and output legitimacy. Input 
legitimacy is concerned with evaluating the transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability of 
procedures in planning, decision making and rule making. Output legitimacy, in turn, asks 
whether the plans and decisions result in collective problem solving and performance (cf. 
Bäckstrand 2006, Kronsell and Bäckstrand 2010: 39). 
The apparent paradox in the approach of recognizing the fluidity and context-specificity of 
legitimacy, while simultaneously applying concepts based on seemingly Western notions of 
normative legitimacy to assess it, warrants explanation. It may be rightly questioned whether 
the concepts of input and output legitimacy, as defined above, are appropriate analytic tools in 
the African context (cf. Schatzberg 1993) where pluralist legal orders are rife due to historical 
co-existence of colonial and customary socio-legal systems and more recently, emergent 
forms of multi-actor governance as a result of decentralization and development projects. 
25 
 
While attention is paid to the effects of legal pluralism on local notions of legitimacy, the use 
of input and output legitimacy as analytic tools is justified by their close connections to the 
theoretical underpinnings of democratic decentralization, and more broadly, to the 
participation discourse in conservation and development. Such an approach may be fruitful in 
exploring how the expectations of improved performance of forest governance following 
democratic decentralization, or ostensibly participatory forest conservation interventions, play 
out in legal pluralist contexts.  
In assessing the input legitimacy of the forest conservation processes, this study focuses on 
three elements (cf. Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008, Kronsell and Bäckstrand 2010): inclusive, 
equal and representative participation; deliberative quality of the process; and accountability. 
The equitable inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders in decision-making processes is 
posited to increase the ownership over decision making through participation, leading to 
increased support to the decisions (Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008: 13). The sustainability of 
common pool resource management is suggested to be enhanced through the inclusion of 
many of the affected individuals and groups in the negotiation of resource harvesting and 
protection rules (Ostrom 1990). Dynamic processes of deliberation − inquiring, arguing and 
learning together, including persuasion free of coercion (Manin 1987) − are increasingly seen 
as a fundamental component of democratic representation (e.g. Urbinati and Warren 2008). 
Based on transparent argumentation and consideration of alternative actions from various 
relevant angles, decisions are more legitimate, although not necessarily unanimous (cf. Manin 
1987). This may be assessed as the “deliberative quality of opinion and will formation” 
(Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008: 14). Transparency in information sharing, along with 
awareness of legal rights and procedures, and mechanisms for redress, such as access to 
courts and mediation, is also important for accountability (Ribot 2002, Beisheim and 
Dingwerth 2008). Accountability concerns both the answerability of decision makers, i.e. 
their obligation to provide information and explanations concerning decisions and actions, as 
well as the ability of constituencies to oversee the decision makers, apply sanctions and seek 
redress if the answers are unsatisfactory (Ribot 2002: 29).  
2.6. Livelihood strategies, resilience and outcomes 
What may be considered the outcomes of dynamic, multi-actor governance processes, 
represent snapshots of the reality at a given point in time, from the chosen angle of evaluation, 
which tends to specific to cultures and organizations. Social and environmental impact 
evaluations hence seldom produce ‘absolute truths’ (Preskill 2009). The concept of ‘impact’ 
used in Study I is borrowed from Slootweg et al. (2001), meaning something felt or 
experienced in a physical or cognitive sense, whether at the level of individual, household, or 
community. This approach allows identifying both outcomes which are particular to the 
aspirations of actors in the local socio-cultural context, as well as measuring outcomes 
relating to certain internationally accepted indicators of well-being. Impacts are also 
understood as often unintended outcomes that unfold over time, at any stage of a conservation 
intervention, as opposed to effects attributable to an intervention in a logical framework type 
of thinking, detectable only in the formal end of a process (Koponen and Mustalahti 2011).      
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The current conceptualization of livelihoods relates to theories on sustainable rural livelihoods 
(Chambers and Conway 1992, Scoones 1998, 2009, Ellis 2000) which similarly take a holistic 
systems approach to analysing the determinants of well-being and rural livelihood 
sustainability,  recognizing that there are always multiple outcomes. Once accessed, resources 
may be called ‘assets’ that are combined with livelihood activities in particular social-
institutional settings to constitute livelihood strategies. Livelihood strategies should be 
understood as processes that unfold over time, as opposed to livelihood ‘activities’, such as 
farming, fishing, wage labour, etc. (cf. Scoones 1998, 2009, Ellis 2000).  
A key feature of sustainable livelihoods is resilience, or the ability to cope with or recover 
from stresses and shocks caused by changes in access (Scoones 1998, Ellis 2000). A common 
strategy to increase resilience is diversification of livelihood activities, an often on-going 
social and economic process shaped by factors of pressure and opportunity in dynamic social-
ecological systems (Ellis 2000: 14). In order to cope, i.e. temporarily adjust in the face of 
change, or to adapt, meaning longer-term shifts in livelihood strategies according to changed 
circumstances, actors’ substitution abilities are critical.  A low flexibility or ability to 
substitute one type of asset with another decreases resilience, and hence increases 
vulnerability and the improbability of achieving sustainable livelihoods (Ellis 2000: 42). This 
flexibility is again shaped by access, including its relational and structural aspects (Davies and 
Hossain 1997, Ellis 2000, Ribot and Peluso 2003). Disruptions in access may affect the 
poorest disproportionally because of their already narrower portfolio of assets (Pearce and 
Swanson 2008). Social norms and identities may dictate the kind of diversification 
opportunities or coping mechanisms available to different actors, with important implications 
for e.g. women’s resilience (Davies and Hossain 1997).  
Against these observations, it is clear that multiple factors condition livelihood rehabilitation, 
or achievement of sustainable livelihoods, following conservation-related changes in access to 
productive resources. This poses challenges for defining the adequate and fair compensation 
for lost assets that the policies related to conservation-induced displacement and resettlement 
call for. Even from a purely economic perspective, coping or adapting may entail transition or 
transaction costs in addition to the replacement of the lost assets (Pearce and Swanson 2008). 
Therefore, monetary compensation for the measurable market value of lost physical assets 
may not be sufficient to guarantee successful post-intervention livelihood rehabilitation 
(Cernea 2003). It may also be difficult or even impossible to monetize or otherwise materially 
compensate for such social and human capital as cultural values, meanings, or beliefs 
associated with specific resources, resource uses, and places, which may have conditioned 
people’s resilience in the past but no longer apply in the changed circumstances. Although 
there have been some attempts to theorize the various factors that shape (development or 
conservation-related) post-displacement livelihood rehabilitation beyond monetary 
compensation (cf. Cernea and Mathur 2008), documented empirical testing of these theories is 
scarce.  
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3. Material and Methods  
3.1. Study context  
3.1.1. Framework for forest governance in Tanzania  
Tanzania is endowed with approx. 450,500 sq. km of forest and woodland, amounting to 
nearly half of the total land area of the country (FAO 2010b). Most of this is miombo 
woodlands, followed by scattered coastal forests and mangroves. Biodiversity-rich humid 
montane forests, such as the Eastern Arc Mountain forests, currently form only a fraction of 
the total forest area (less than 2%, Wily and Dewees 2001: 2). The exact areas of forest and 
woodland, and further the areas of different types of forest, are debated due to fragmented and 
outdated data (FAO 2010b). An on-going National Forest Resources Monitoring and 
Assessment effort is expected to produce more reliable data by 2012 (http://www.mnrt.go.tz/, 
accessed 21 August 2012). 
The framework of central control over forests, and all natural resources, was established in 
Tanzania during colonial rule. Many of the resource rights of local people were ruptured as 
the state law subordinated local customary laws. The practices were reinforced in the first 
decades of independence (Hurst 2003, Kallonga et al. 2003). The basic division of forests into 
‘reserved’ and ‘unreserved’ forests, still underlying many legal and policy provisions in 
Tanzania, dates back to the colonial era. Wily and Dewees (2001: 3) point out that reservation 
does not denote a tenure system; yet until recently, all forest reserves were strictly – even if 
not necessarily effectively or efficiently – controlled by the state, and the vast majority of the 
forest reserves continue to be so. This classification does not determine the use of the forest 
area, either; reservation may take place for production or protection purposes alike.  During 
colonial rule, both interests determined management objectives (Iversen 1991, Woodcock 
2002), but as a result of post-independence development trajectories, management of the 
government reserves is now largely orientated towards conservation. It has been argued that 
in the first decade of independence, forestry, and foresters as custodians of the vast forest 
reserves – the then Forest Division, precursor of the current Forestry and Beekeeping Division 
of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism – became marginalized actors in terms of 
contributions to the national economy and growth, out of sync with the mainstream 
development objectives (Hurst 2003). Yet forest exploitation for timber and charcoal 
production soared in the 1970s through government-led initiatives, assisted by overseas 
development aid (Sunseri 2005). The current dominant management paradigm, focused on 
exclusionary conservation through enforcement of the existing government reserves and the 
creation of new ones, has been attributed to the growing influence of international 
conservation and development actors on national policies since the 1980s (Sunseri 2005, 
Vihemäki 2009).  
Along with the global policy shifts, community-based approaches to forestry and natural 
resource governance were cautiously introduced into the portfolio of forest conservation 
instruments through pilot initiatives in 1980s-90s (Wily and Dewees 2001, Woodcock 2002). 
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In the 1990s, development in Tanzania took the same turn as in many other countries 
grappling with the legacy of colonialism. Democratic decentralization was introduced to 
address the observed shortcomings of centralized natural resource control that had rendered 
vast areas of land under inefficient management and failed to create benefits for the majority 
of the nation’s poor rural population. The rationale behind the forest tenure reform echoed 
that of the wider movement towards decentralization globally: strengthening local ownership 
and participation in forest management was expected to increase the effectiveness of 
management and to create more social benefits, ultimately contributing to poverty reduction 
(cf. URT 1998a, 2005, Kallonga et al. 2003). Forest decentralization followed the tenure 
reform of land and local governance (Table 1), enabling many of its key objectives.  
Table 1. Key laws and policies related to the decentralization of local government, land and 
forests in mainland Tanzania.   
Sector Law or policy Year of 
enactment 
Local 
Governance  
Local Government Authority (District and Urban) Act 1982 
Local Government Reform Programme 2000 
Land National Land Policy 1997 
 Land Act 
Village Land Act 
1999 
1999 
Forest National Forest Policy 1998 
 Forest Act 2002 
Community-Based Forest Management Guidelines 2007 
Source: Modified based on Table 5.1 in Rantala and Lyimo (2011: 111).  
One of the aims of the Local Government Reform Programme is political decentralization, the 
devolution of powers to locally elected councils and committees at district, ward and village 
levels. Local governments are accountable to the parliament, autonomous of the central 
government. They have the responsibility for social development and public service provision 
within their jurisdiction, including facilitation of national policy implementation in various 
sectors, such as natural resources and forestry (URT 1998b).  
Village is the lowest formal unit of government. The powers to manage natural resources on 
village land, a legal land category meaning land within surveyed village boundaries, have 
been vested in the village council. The 25 members of the village council consist of the 
chairpersons of sub-villages (Swa. pl. vitongoji) and representatives elected by the village 
assembly, to which the council is accountable in many of its decisions. The village assembly 
is a periodic meeting that is open to all residents above 18 years of age; a central arena for 
public participation, deliberation and decision-making in the village. At an intermediate level 
between the village and district, chairpersons of the village councils and village executive 
officers, appointed professional officials, form the ward development council. The district 
council is the central decision-making body at the district level. It consists of elected members 
from each ward in the district, members appointed by the minister for local government, 
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selected members from party organizations and among village chairpersons, and local 
members of parliament (Local Government [District Authorities] Act 1982).  
In principle, the relationships between levels are to be administrative, technical, consultative 
and advisory in nature (URT 1998b). Nevertheless, the decentralized land and forest laws 
contain elements that maintain a degree of top-down control over village natural resource 
management. For example, many village land and forest management documents require 
approval by the district council, which also supervises the implementation of village land use 
and forest management plans. At the same time, mechanisms of downward accountability 
available to the village assembly are limited to the approval or disapproval of decisions made 
by the village council (Wily 2003, Sundet 2005).  
The land law reform in the late 1990s produced the Land Act (1999) and Village Land Act 
(1999) which set out the current statutory provisions for land tenure in Tanzania, with 
important implications for forest access. These laws define the rights to land that citizens may 
hold, while all land (soil) remains in the custody of the president of the republic on behalf of 
all people, as a colonial legacy.  
Customary rights are the principal way for the Tanzanian rural population to access land, in 
many cases meaning the prevailing local practices of land access and not always requiring 
historical precedence (Wily 2003). Although the Village Land Act recognizes customary 
rights as existing and secure rights even when not registered, village councils may apply for a 
certificate of village land once the village boundaries are determined and agreed upon with 
neighbouring entities, and then grant certificates of customary occupancy to individuals and 
groups in order to enhance the security of the rights. In practice, however, district and central 
government officials continue to disregard customary rights if there is no certificate of village 
land or certificates of customary ownership, which is the case for the vast majority of rural 
Tanzanians (cf. TFCG and MJUMITA 2011). The absence of certificates of village land gives 
space for different interpretations on where general land ends and village land starts. The 
Land Act defines ‘general land’ as a residual category that is not reserved or village land, but 
it may also be considered to include unused or unoccupied village land. This caveat could be 
used to exclude villagers from considerable areas of common property, if ‘unused’ is taken to 
mean ‘uncultivated’. Similarly, village councils may consider unused or undeveloped private 
parcels as communal land (Village Land Act 1999, Sections 57(1) and 23(1), Wily 2003, 
Sundet 2005). It has become clear that forestry officials continue to interpret unregistered 
village land as general land, a view repeatedly adopted in e.g. various versions of the National 
Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, REDD+ (URT 
2009, 2011). 
The land laws also state the procedures to be followed in the establishment of forest protected 
areas, involving transfers of village or general land to the category of reserved land. The 
procedures for informing, consulting with, obtaining consent from, and paying compensation 
to local communities are defined in the Village Land Act. The village assembly has the power 
to approve or reject removal of under 250 ha of land from the village, constituting a limited 
right to give or withhold consent to the land transfer. Rights holders to the land to be 
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transferred, including holders of customary rights, whether registered or not (Village Land 
Regulations 2001), are entitled to a compensation, the terms of which (type, amount and 
timing) need to be mutually agreed upon before the transfer can take place. The Village Land 
Regulations (2001, 8-10) state that compensation is to be paid for the land itself together with 
improvements. In addition to the property of individual occupants, compensation must also be 
paid for communal land within the village (Regulation 8a).  
The establishment of protected forest areas is also governed by forest legislation, in line with 
the provisions of the land laws and reflecting the emphasis on increased public participation 
in forest management that the National Forest Policy (URT 1998a) calls for. In addition to 
defining the consultative processes and an investigation of customary forest rights, the Forest 
Act (2002) prompts to consider alternative actions if such customary rights are proven to 
exist. These include modification of the rights or modification of the conservation plan to 
accommodate the two, conservation of the area through community-based forest management, 
rejection of the plan in light of local livelihood costs, or declaration of the reserve regardless 
of existing rights because of the high national or international importance of conserving the 
area (Section 24). In case the reserve establishment process proceeds, rights holders are 
entitled to “full and fair compensation” for the reallocation of their rights (Section 22). The 
Forest Act also defines mechanisms to redress unsatisfactory decisions. Despite elaborate 
consultative processes, the forest law does not provide affected communities with the right to 
withhold consent to conservation plans. 
 
Regarding forest decentralization, the National Forest Policy (URT 1998a) and Forest Act 
(2002) build on the legal framework of communal land tenure administered by the village 
councils. The two approaches to participatory forest management recognized by the national 
legislation are Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) and Joint Forest Management 
(JFM). CBFM concerns forest management by village communities on village land, in theory 
providing opportunities for some of the most devolved powers for local communities to 
manage their forests in sub-Saharan Africa (Katila 2008, Ribot et al. 2010). Table 2 presents 
the status of the efforts to scale up CBFM across the country. JFM, in turn, focuses on joint 
management agreements on central government forest reserves between the government and 
adjacent local communities. The implementation of the JFM policy has been marred by 
difficulties and has practically stalled because the State Treasury has failed to approve the 
general benefit-sharing principles for the joint management agreements. At the field site of 
the current study, JFM processes were started in the late 1990s but the initiatives have largely 
succumbed to dormancy due to the unresolved national policy issues. This study, therefore, is 
concerned with assessing the performance of CBFM. The focus is also justified because the 
CBFM policy model in Tanzania conforms very well to the theoretical principles of 
democratic decentralization, providing an interesting opportunity to investigate how the 
expectations of forest tenure reform play out in practice.   
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Table 2. Status of Community-Based Forest Management policy implementation in Tanzania.  
Area of forest under CBFM 2.35 million ha 
Number of villages engaged in CBFM 1,457 
Number of districts engaged in CBFM 51 
Forest types under CBFM, % of total area covered Miombo woodlands, 68%  
 Acacia woodlands, 16% 
 Coastal forests, 15% 
 Montane forests, 1% 
Source: URT (2008a), Blomley et al. (2010). 
Based on a review of relevant policies, two broad policy objectives of CBFM may be 
identified: 1) sustainable forest management, and 2) improved rural livelihoods (Blomley and 
Ramadhani 2006). A third goal, security of tenure, is mentioned in the National Forest Policy 
(URT 1998a) and in a revised policy draft produced in 2008 (URT 2008b) as the primary 
means to achieve the two ultimate goals, although the causal mechanism is not specified.  
The expectations of livelihood benefits are largely implicit in the policy texts. In the forest 
policy, it is stated that village land forest reserves are to be managed “for production and/or 
protection based on sustainable management objectives” (URT 1998a, Policy statement 6). 
One of the components under the Tanzania National Forest Programme, the principal 
instrument to implement the forest policy, is Forestry-based Industries and Sustainable 
Livelihoods, which, however, focuses on promoting private sector investment in forest 
industry development and does not specify livelihood objectives related to community 
forestry (cf. URT 2001). The National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty 
stands out as the only policy document with the explicit target to “scale up Participatory 
Forest Management in all Districts, as a mechanism for increasing income of rural 
communities from natural resources management” (URT 2005: Annex p. 11). The national 
CBFM guidelines note that villagers may reserve their forest in order to “obtain tangible 
benefits from sustainable harvesting” (URT 2007: 1). An evaluation of the success of 
participatory forest management in contributing to rural livelihoods commissioned by the 
government supports the notion of implicit livelihood benefit expectations (URT 2008c).  
The CBFM policy focuses on the demarcation and setting aside of village land forest reserves 
(VFR) or community forest reserves within which the villagers resource rights are considered 
most secure (cf. URT 2007). This is justified in the policy as a necessary measure to secure 
the protection of the village forest by the national law, and to counter threats of forest 
conversion to other land uses (URT 2007: 3). Villagers, through the village council, have the 
right to make and enforce rules concerning harvesting of timber and forest products, 
exclusion, and sanctions for violators. They may collect fines and collect and retain forest 
royalties (Blomley 2006). The management of the VFR, including enforcing the rules, 
monitoring and sanctioning activities, is usually vested in a village natural resources 
committee (or ‘forest committee’) elected in the village assembly. The processes to be 
followed for the establishment of VFRs are summarized in Table 9 in Section 4.4. Although 
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the law requires a review of existing customary rights to resources in case a declared village 
land forest reserve is to be gazetted, it is silent on how customary rights to forest and land 
should be taken into account in the initial stages of VFR establishment, when the decision is 
made and the boundaries are drawn.  
The National Forest Policy (1998a) identified a gap in the institutional framework concerning 
the management of private forests. The Forest Act (2002) encourages participatory ‘planning, 
management, use and conservation of forest resources through the development of individual 
and community rights, whether derived from customary law or under this Act’ (Section 3[b]). 
Yet the law makes no reference to customary or local management of forest and trees in 
privately held or unreserved communal village areas. Villagers’ rights to the so-called 
reserved trees – valuable timber or endangered tree species that have been protected by state 
law since pre-independence (Woodcock 2002) – are only considered secure when the trees 
grow within an established village land forest reserve, according to the prevailing practice (cf. 
Blomley 2006, URT 2007). Nevertheless, the Forest Act states that the reserved trees clause 
ceases to apply if the trees are not on general land (Section 65[3]), e.g. they are on village 
land, whether within a VFR or not. This observation again underlines the pivotal importance 
of defining village land vs. general land for formalizing local access to forest resources.  
3.1.2. East Usambara Mountains: a microcosm of global changes in forest 
governance 
The East Usambara Mountains are situated in Tanga region, northeastern Tanzania. They are 
part of the Eastern Arc Mountain range, a renowned biodiversity ‘hotspot’ in East Africa 
extending across eastern Tanzania to southern Kenya. More than a hundred species of 
endemic flora and fauna are confined to the East Usambara Mountain forests, especially the 
upland evergreen Afromontane rainforest (Rodgers and Homewood 1982, Myers 1990, 
Burgess et al. 2007). The mountains are also home to people who have practiced agriculture 
on the mountain slopes for hundreds of years (Feierman 1974, Conte 2004). Administratively, 
the East Usambara Mountains landscape of about 1,300 km2 (Hamilton 1989a: 29) is 
currently part of the districts of Muheza, Mkinga and Korogwe. The population of 28 
mountain villages in three divisions included in the East Usambara Forest Landscape 
Restoration Project of the World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Tanzania Forest 
Conservation Group (TFCG) was estimated to be 135,000 in 2008 (Malugu et al. 2008). 
Competing interests in forestland, based on global biodiversity values of the now heavily 
fragmented forests, on the one hand, and growing local demand for agricultural land, on the 
other, are in the epicentre of conservation-development tensions in the East Usambaras. 
Although the scope and intensity of human disturbance of the East Usambara Mountain 
forests has varied, it has a long history (Hamilton and Bensted-Smith 1989, Iversen 1991, 
Conte 2004). The current landscape of the mountains reflects the varying socio-economic, 
political, and cultural interests of diverse actors that have left their mark in the forest-
agriculture mosaic. These interests have been heavily influenced by the changing market and 
policy conditions that have shaped natural resource management objectives globally since the 
start of the colonial era.  
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Accounts of pre-colonial settlement in the East Usambaras are based on archaeological 
evidence (cf. Hamilton 1989b, Conte 2004), reports by German explorers in the late 1800s 
(cf. Iversen 1991, Conte 2004), as well as detailed ethnographic research carried out in the 
1960-90s (Winans 1962, Feierman 1974, Woodcock 2002, Conte 2004). The Shambaa, still 
the largest ethnic group in the area, share traditions regarding the arrival of the ruling class of 
Kilindi around 1740. By the 19th century, an extensive Shambaa kingdom encompassed the 
West and East Usambara Mountains (Feierman 1974, Iversen 1991). Most rights to land were 
politically vested in the Kilindi rulers who were thought to hold the power to bring rain, 
essential for the survival of the agriculturalist Shambaa. Forested wilderness areas in the 
mountains were associated with rainmaking and included many sacred, protected sites. Other 
forests and cultivated areas were under community tenure, in the custody of Shambaa lineages 
that could make and enforce rules about access, management, withdrawal and exclusion 
regarding land and forest resources. A council of elders, consisting of the heads of each 
lineage in the village, mediated disputes and was accountable to the local Kilindi chief. Rights 
to use and manage land could be bought and sold privately. Shambaa women had rights to 
land and trees of their lineage, which had to be relinquished upon marriage. Women could not 
inherit their husbands, but could regain access to resources within their lineage if divorced or 
widowed. Polygamy was the norm, and each wife had to be provided with land to cultivate, 
which was then inherited by the children of that wife. Differing accounts regarding the 
security of customary Shambaa land rights have been presented, but in some cases planting 
trees could enhance it. The felling of trees was controlled by leaders, and required a ritual to 
calm the benevolent and malevolent spirits that resided in the trees. Certain trees were 
specifically protected by beliefs and taboos (Dobson 1940, Winans 1962, Feierman 1974, 
Woodcock 2002, Rantala and Lyimo 2011). As such, the customary system may have 
favoured the survival and spread of certain species over others, and shaped the mountains’ 
ecosystems.   
The customary tenure system started to erode after the arrival of the Germans. During colonial 
rule, land became formally property of the state and was divided it into forest reserves, private 
estates and public land (Hamilton and Mwasha 1989a, Woodcock 2002). Most of the today’s 
20-odd government forest reserves in the East Usambaras were established pre-independence 
(Iversen 1991). The colonial administration, including the British who replaced the Germans 
after the First World War, was concerned about the exclusionary conservation of forests for 
water services, climate regulation and soil erosion control (Hamilton and Mwasha 1989b), 
although timber export interests may have influenced management strategies in practice 
(Iversen 1991, Woodcock 2002). The recent history of the East Usambaras makes for a case 
in point regarding the pivotal role of colonialism for the changing practices of forest 
management in the tropics (cf. Conte 2004). The rupturing of customary tenure systems and 
the formal closure of forests from people, in practice converting them to open access as the 
administration had reduced capacities to enforce regimes, the legitimacy of which was 
contested, contributed to the development of unsustainable practices. As the authority of 
traditional leaders was gradually undermined, no one assumed forest management 
responsibilities on public land. The tendency was compounded during the first decades of 
independence as the government policies sought to reverse the alienation of the local 
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population from land in estates and reserves, increased areas of public land and contributed to 
the expansion of forest conversion (cf. Hamilton and Mwasha 1989c, Woodcock 2002, Conte 
2004). It is of course impossible to say how the East Usambara landscape would look like 
today without the colonial interventions. Conte (2004) has drawn attention to the impact of 
colonialism-induced market integration on local approaches to natural resource utilization at 
the same time as the colonizers themselves increasingly romanticized and sought to segregate 
‘pristine’ mountain landscapes from human use. In this case, as in many others, colonialism 
spurred the observed development trajectory, but even without a similar history, it is very rare 
to encounter areas that would remain outside of the influence of the global market economy 
today.  
From the late 1940s, forest exploitation expanded with the emergence of new profit-oriented 
actors, such as the Sikh Sawmills that acquired several tea estates in the uplands but focused 
on logging rather than tea production (Iversen 1991, Conte 2004). Work opportunities in tea 
and sisal estates as well as the sawmilling industries attracted immigrants from other parts of 
Tanzania, contributing to the erosion of local cultural values and beliefs associated with 
forests (Rantala and Lyimo 2011). Many of these migrants settled in nearby villages, clearing 
forest for the cultivation of cardamom and other spice crops. Cardamom was first introduced 
to the area by the Germans, and gradually became the mainstay cash crop for East Usambaran 
small-scale farmers (Iversen 1991, Vihemäki 2009). The prevailing practices of cardamom 
agroforestry have been associated with a detrimental environmental trajectory in which the 
natural forest undergrowth is first cleared to make way for cardamom seedlings that require 
the shade of the trees to flourish. When soil fertility is exhausted, more trees are cleared as the 
cardamom gives way to sun-grown crops. In the end, the land is abandoned, developing into 
grassland and thicket that no longer regenerates as forest (cf. Stocking and Perkin 1992, 
Reyes et al. 2006, Bullock et al. 2011). Cardamom cultivation is thus seen as one of the major 
drivers of forest degradation and deforestation in the East Usambaras (e.g. Hamilton and 
Mwasha 1989c).  
The commercial forestry operations in the East Usambaras intensified as foreign interests 
came to play again in the 1970s, this time in the form of development aid. The government of 
Finland supported the operations of the Sikh Saw Mills, by then nationalized, logging timber 
and processing them in the regional capital of Tanga. By the early 1980s, environmental 
damage caused by the extractive activities started to attract growing criticism nationally and 
internationally. Researchers strived to bring the unique biodiversity values of the East 
Usambaran forests, now under threat, to the fore (e.g. Rodgers and Homewood 1982, cf. 
Vihemäki 2009). The logging operations gradually ceased from mid-1980s onwards 
(Hamilton and Mwasha 1989c, Mwalubandu et al. 1991). Forest inventories in 1986-87 
confirmed the critical state of the East Usambara forests due to the unsustainable forestry 
practices (Hamilton and Mwasha 1989c). 
To make up for the damage caused, Finland agreed to support the Tanzanian government in 
strengthening sustainable forest management in the East Usambaras for the conservation of 
biodiversity and environmental services, such as the hydrological services that the region and 
the city of Tanga depended on. Parallel to the global environmental processes that culminated 
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in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992, the East Usambara Catchment Forest Project (EUCFP) was launched in 1991, and the 
management of the landscape began to be geared towards conservation. Efforts were focused 
on the enforcement of the existing forest reserves and the creation of new ones, including the 
establishment of the Amani Nature Reserve in 1997. The local counterpart of the project was 
the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) of the Ministry of the Natural Resources and 
Tourism (MNRT). The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) together with 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, with support by the European 
Commission, was simultaneously implementing the East Usambara Conservation and 
Development Project, an example of the ICDPs of the time. While attention to local 
participation in the global conservation and development discourse was growing, the two 
projects were joined as the East Usambara Conservation Area Management Programme 
(EUCAMP), implemented in 1999-2002. Environmental education, farm forestry and 
community forestry pilots featured on the agenda, although scientific biodiversity inventories 
and enforcement of the protection of the government forest reserves remained the core 
objectives of the project. The project and government officials were keen to delegate forest 
management tasks to local people, but the approach remained very much top-down. The 
devolution of forest rights and powers to local communities was limited and cautious, and 
their role was seen as more instrumental in implementing pre-defined forest conservation 
objectives (Stocking and Perkin 1992, EUCFP 1995, Tye 1995, Ellman 1996, EUCAMP 
2002, Veltheim and Kijazi 2002, Vihemäki 2009).  
Today, implementation of the national policy objectives regarding the management of state 
forest reserves is continued in the East Usambaras by FBD through its Tanga offices and the 
Amani Nature Reserve headquarters. The implementation of the National Forest Program is 
supported through the World Bank-funded Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management 
Project and the Eastern Arc Mountains Conservation Endowment Fund 
(www.easternarc.or.tz, accessed 8 August, 2012). The status of the JFM initiatives started 
during EUCAMP in the villages adjacent to two forest reserves in the East Usambara 
Mountains (Veltheim and Kijazi 2002) is unclear, and it is apparent that the villagers have not 
been actively involved in the implementation of the management plans in recent years 
(Vihemäki 2009, Rantala et al. 2011). The management of forests outside of the reserves on 
general land falls under the mandate of the district administration. District natural resource 
and forest officers are to facilitate the establishment and implementation of participatory 
forest management in their jurisdiction, principally by strengthening community ownership 
over forests on village land through CBFM. This effort, however, largely rests on NGOs, 
TFCG and WWF, that have promoted CBFM in various East Usambaran villages as part of 
their Forest Landscape Restoration Project since 2004. The district officials are mainly 
preoccupied with timber harvesting control (Rantala et al. 2011).  
3.1.3 Background to Studies I and II: the Derema Corridor 
In the 1990s, attention was drawn to the fragmentation of the East Usambara Mountain 
forests, increasingly confined within the borders of the reserves. The decreased landscape 
connectivity formed a threat for the survival of the endemic biodiversity and ecological 
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functioning of the mountain ecosystems. Several conservation corridors were proposed to be 
established to connect the reserves. Among these, the Derema corridor was considered the 
most urgent for its role in connecting the Amani Nature Reserve in the southern part of the 
landscape with forest blocks to the north (Newmark 1993, Tye 1995, Figure 3). Despite the 
stated ecological importance, it was estimated that the Derema area was almost completely 
cultivated by small-holder farmers by the 1990s (Johansson and Sandy 1996), which had 
previously led to the abandonment of the conservation plans (Iversen 1991). The corridor 
establishment process was started as part of the EUCAMP project in 1999. The main events 
are summarized in Table 3.  
Table 3. Main events in the establishment of the Derema Corridor (modified based on Table 1 
in Study II).  
1974 Derema area first considered as a forest reserve 
early 1990s East Usambara Catchment Forest Project starts. Derema again proposed as 
a forest reserve, later as a wildlife corridor 
1999 Establishment of Derema corridor included in the work plan of 
EUCFP/EUCAMP 1999-2002 
July 2000 Social Impact Assessment (SIA) carried out in the five villages to be 
affected by the corridor 
March-June 2001 Boundary survey and demarcation 
July 2001 Mid-term review of EUCAMP recommends an alternative, community-
based conservation approach  
August 2001 Reservation approach upheld in a stakeholders’ workshop in Muheza; 
confirmed by the EUCAMP Steering Committee 
March 2002 Compensation payments for boundary crops  
May-June 2002 Valuation of crops inside the corridor 
December 2002 EUCAMP closure; compensation pending 
2004 World Bank (WB) support sought 
2005 Part of remaining compensation paid to farmers  
2006 Derema Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) prepared for WB 
February-May 2008 Final compensation paid to farmers with WB funding 
January 2010 RAP implementation ends; farmers yet to receive substitute farmland.  
Sources: Iversen 1991, Tye 1993, EUCAMP 1998 and 2000, Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Sjöholm et 
al. 2001, Pohjonen 2002, URT 2006, authors’ data. 
A Social Impact Assessment (SIA, Jambiya and Sosovele 2000) conducted in the five villages 
to be affected − IBC Msasa, Kwezitu, Kambai, Kwemdimu and Kisiwani − in 2000 provided 
information on the socio-economic context of the conservation intervention. Although the 
exact figures are debated (see Study II), more than a thousand farmers were to be affected by 
loss of land to the corridor. Ninety-nine percent of the population included in the SIA study 
depended on cardamom cultivation, typically intercropped with food crops, as their most 
important source of income. The land access of these farmers was based on customary tenure 
by local Shambaa kinship groups, as well as allocation by the villages’ leadership and the 
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government post-independence. Virtually no one had any official documentation concerning 
their land occupancy (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Study I). A third of the people to be 
affected had landholdings smaller than the current East Usambara uplands average (between 
2.6 and 3.6 ha, depending on the village; cf. Reyes et al. 2010, Bullock et al. 2011), while a 
small minority was well endowed by local standards, accessing over 8 ha of land. The 
majority had one or two plots, including farms outside the corridor area (Jambiya and 
Sosovele 2000: 13). Only farmland was included in the corridor plan; the boundaries were 
drawn to exclude settlements to avoid costly relocation (URT 2006). 
Despite initial resistance, probably due to negative experiences related to the establishment of 
the Amani Nature Reserve (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Vihemäki 2009), the farmers agreed 
to the conservation plan. The boundary of the 956 hectare corridor was demarcated in mid-
2001, and crops in that area were slashed (EUCAMP 2002, Pohjonen 2002). The following 
year, the farmers were paid compensation at a flat rate based on their own estimates of yield 
per plant. Based on this rate, compensation owed to the farmers turned out to be many times 
higher than the project had anticipated (URT 2006). 
As the boundary demarcation was underway, the mid-term review of EUCAMP in 2001 
criticized the programme for sustaining an exclusionary approach to forest conservation and 
recommended that area be conserved through community-based forest management instead 
(Sjöholm et al. 2001, Pohjonen 2002). However, a subsequent “Derema villagers’ workshop 
on the selection of the management approach for the Corridor” concluded that the 
establishment of a government forest reserve in Derema should proceed (Pohjonen 2002).  
Furthermore, in 2001, EUCAMP was advised by the Ministry of Lands to adhere to the new 
Village Land Act and associated Land Regulations of 1999 (URT 2006). This means that the 
Derema area was eventually considered village land, with implications for the conservation 
and compensation process (cf. Section 3.1.1). Yet the compensation method, which had been 
planned according to the old land law, was never revised. Compensation was only paid for the 
standing crops, not for the lost land rights, nor for any lost access to communal land in the 
villages.  
Farmers with land inside the corridor were registered in mid-2002. The method of identifying 
those eligible for compensation involved calling farmers onto their fields on certain days as 
teams of valuers surveyed the area. Only the counted crops and the farmers’ names were 
recorded (URT 2006: 18-19).  
The estimates of the total sum of compensation needed changed several times as EUCAMP 
strived to complete the process (cf. Pohjonen 2002). Following the boundary compensation, a 
new method was applied in which plants recorded on each farm were classified into payment 
categories according to their maturity and expected yield. Seedlings entitled to little 
compensation, while higher payments were made for mature plants (Pohjonen 2002, URT 
2006). Despite the new approach, EUCAMP closed in 2002 without sufficient funds to 
finalize the payments.  
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In 2004, the process continued upon involvement of new actors. MNRT approached the 
World Bank to request financial aid in order to complete the compensation and corridor 
establishment. The government paid about half of the compensation to each farmer in 2005. 
Final compensation payments, with an interest added, were paid after the Tanzanian 
government had secured funding from the World Bank in March-May 2008. As part of the 
agreement, a Resettlement Action Plan (URT 2006) was prepared according to the World 
Bank Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 on resettlement. The plan included “income restoration 
measures” such as dairy cattle, beekeeping, butterfly farming, and fish ponds to target the 
poorest affected farmers. In addition to the financial compensation, 3-acre farm plots on 
former sisal estates in the lowlands surrounding the East Usambara Mountains were planned 
for interested farmers (URT 2006). The Resettlement Action Plan expired in early 2010. The 
substitute land allocation issue remained unresolved at the time this summary was drafted in 
August 2012.  
The current study was focused on the subvillages of Makanya, in IBC Msasa, and Antakae in 
Kwezitu, which were perceived by local key informants to be the most severely affected by 
displacement from the corridor (see also Reyes et al. 2010). Field research coincided with the 
final stages of the (formal) Derema corridor establishment process, starting some months 
before the final payments in 2008, during the payments, a few months after them, and again 
over a year after the final compensation in 2009.  
Makanya is located in the middle of the current corridor; the boundaries were drawn to avoid 
inclusion of the settlement, forming a notch in the shape of the reserve. Most inhabitants had 
been cultivating in the area that was conserved. Antakae is located adjacent to the corridor on 
its northwestern side (Figure 3). At the time of the corridor establishment, the livelihood 
strategies of people in these two villages were highly specialized in cardamom farming; only 
a handful of youth from Makanya, and the immigrant population of Antakae, were employed 
by the tea estates adjacent to the two villages. Makanya has been argued to be one of the 
oldest villages in the East Usambaras, possibly dating back to the pre-colonial era, although 
the exact location of the village has somewhat varied (Vihemäki 2009: 154). Cardamom 
cultivation was started in the 1960s, initiating in the areas opened up by logging (Vihemäki 
2009: 156).  
In addition to the farming of cash crops − cardamom as well as other spices, mainly cinnamon 
and cloves − the Derema area had provided the people with a source of food, firewood, 
medicine, timber and building materials. Food crops, such as banana and yams, were typically 
intercropped in the agroforestry systems. Women collected wild foods in the forest, and to an 
extent, bushmeat was hunted. Traditionally, parts of the forest had functioned as sites of rites 
and spells. In addition to the corridor forest, people also had farms elsewhere, including 
cardamom farms in other locations in the mountains as well as open fields of maize, beans 
and cassava closer to the homesteads (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Study I). 
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3.1.4 Background to Studies III and IV: Community-Based Forest Management 
During the EUCFP and EUCAMP projects, Community-Based Forest Management was 
piloted in a few villages around the East Usambara Mountains, largely following the steps of 
planning, by-law making and forest surveying later included in the national guidelines (URT 
2007, cf. Ellman 1996, Veltheim and Kijazi 2002, Mustalahti 2006). Smaller NGO-led 
initiatives had also been started in the 1990s, such as the one around Kambai village in the 
lowlands (Woodcock 2002, Vihemäki 2009), and IUCN had facilitated village forest 
management in Makanya village, in the area of the future Derema corridor (Vihemäki 2009). 
Although differing economic and political interests within the villages regarding the forest 
resources posed some challenges, initial experiences were deemed largely positive. However, 
the establishment processes did not reach the final district approval status, except for one 
VFR which was even gazetted (cf. Veltheim and Kijazi 2002, Mustalahti 2006).  
Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, a Tanzanian NGO with a mission to conserve the 
Eastern Arc Mountain forests (www.tfcg.org, accessed 9 August, 2012), has worked in the 
East Usambaras since early 1990s, starting with the Kambai forest conservation project 
(Woodcock 2002). Since 2004, collaboration with WWF Tanzania Program Office and WWF 
Finland has provided the organization the means to expand their work throughout the 
landscape, focusing on the facilitation of Community-Based Forest Management on village 
land. Activities also include creating alternative income generating activities for villagers 
such as beekeeping, butterfly farming and fishponds, as well as the establishment of 
communal tree nurseries. By 2009, the project included 16 villages (WWF 2009). It has 
targeted villages that occupy critical locations for forest connectivity in the landscape, with 
the aim of increasing tree cover in areas that could function as ecological corridors between 
the largest forest blocks (Doggart et al. 2007).  
In 2007, the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR) launched the ‘Landscape Mosaics’ research project which combined 
action research and conventional multidisciplinary research to facilitate better integration of 
biodiversity conservation and local livelihoods in landscape management (http://ongoing-
research.cgiar.org/factsheets/cifor-icraf-biodiversity-platform-research-on-biodiversity-
conservation-on-a-landscape-level, accessed 9 August, 2012). The Tanzania site of this 
comparative project was chosen to be the East Usambaras, in collaboration with the existing 
TFCG/WWF project. The field research for the current study regarding Community-Based 
Forest Management was carried out in conjunction with the Landscape Mosaics project, 
focusing on three villages, while I worked as the ICRAF site leader of the project in 2007-
2009. These villages, Shambangeda and Misalai in the uplands of the mountains, and 
Kwatango in the lowlands, were also identified as “corridor villages” in the TFCG/WWF 
project (Doggart et al. 2007). CBFM establishment and implementation was at different 
stages in the villages by the time the research was conducted (Table 4), while the village land 
use planning processes coincided with it in 2008. Collaboration with the projects provided me 
with a front seat view of the governance processes within the villages, although it may also 
have created a certain bias in the research process, discussed in section 5.1. The project also 
involved an MA student to work in three additional villages of the TFCG/WWF project 
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(Table 4), looking into partially overlapping issues of CBFM (cf. Bullock 2010) and 
eventually contributing to Study III. I also expanded field work to these villages through 
complementary interviews in 2009. In Zirai and Mgambo, CBFM had first been piloted in the 
late 1990s (cf. Veltheim & Kijazi 2002), but the scheme had gone through some years of 
dormancy before being resuscitated by TFCG.     
Table 4. Context of research on Community-Based Forest Management (modified based on 
Table 2 in Study III).  
Village 
Forest 
Reserve 
Reserve 
area (ha) 
Year of 
establishment 
Forest type Focus of 
research 
Kwatango 52 2004 Lowland forest Primary  
Misalai 60 2007 Submontane 
rainforest 
Shambangeda 18 2004 Submontane 
rainforest 
Kwezitu 36 2004 Submontane 
rainforest 
Secondary  
Mgambo 156 1998 (2004) Submontane 
rainforest 
Zirai 36 1998 (2004) Submontane 
rainforest 
 
With the exception of Kwatango, the study villages are located in the densely populated East 
Usambaran uplands (Figure 3). Population densities correlate with rainfall and are higher in 
the uplands of the East Usambaras than in the lowlands, as in other parts of Tanzania (cf. 
Shao 1986). Villages fill areas between the tea plantations and government forest reserves 
(Figure 3), and the village land itself consists of a mosaic of agroforestry systems (cardamom 
intercropped with other spice cash crops and food crops, such as yams and banana), fields of 
sun grown crops such as maize, beans and cassava, and increasingly sugar cane which has 
recently been overtaking cardamom as the most profitable cash crop (Bullock et al. 2011). 
Some small-holder tea is also grown. Reportedly, most of the available farmland in the upland 
villages has been allocated to the inhabitants. Distinct from the study villages in the Derema 
case, a large proportion of people in these villages earn at least part of their annual income by 
working on the commercial tea estates. Patches of forest remain within the VFRs and to an 
extent, on privately held land. Private parcels, however, are always called ‘shamba’, farm; the 
Swahili word for forest, ‘msitu’ is only used of the reserved areas (Rantala and Lyimo 2011). 
This may reflect an ideological separation of forest from human landscape as a colonial 
legacy (cf. Conte 2004: 149).   
Kwatango was a remote village when this research was conducted; before being upgraded, the 
road to the village remained in poor condition for most of the year, severely limiting people’s 
access to public services and economic integration with the rest of the region. The population 
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density was low, and communal land was available for allocation to villagers and newcomers, 
including private investors. Most inhabitants earned their living from farming maize, bananas 
and groundnuts. 
Although a considerable proportion of the current East Usambaran villagers are relative 
newcomers, the Shambaa remain the largest ethnic group in all the study villages. In the 
household surveys carried out as part of the Landscape Mosaics project and this study, half of 
the respondents were of Shambaa ethnicity. Linkages between Shambaa lineages in the West 
and East Usambara Mountains persist, and there is mobility between villages within the 
region. The other half of the population is ethnically very mixed, the Bondei and the Zigua 
being the second-largest ethnic groups. Despite expectations of higher ethnic diversity in the 
upland villages, where most immigration has been directed, the demographics in Kwatango 
were very similar to the other study villages. 
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Figure 3. Study villages in the East Usambara Mountains, Tanga region, Tanzania. Map 
courtesy of Dr Jaclyn Hall, 2011.  
3.2. Methods 
In the absence of comparable data from before the conservation interventions, a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative ethnographic research methods was adopted to piece together a 
detailed picture of the socio-economic outcomes of the establishment of the Derema corridor, 
on the one hand, and of CBFM, on the other, as well as the social processes that have shaped 
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the observed outcomes. The two approaches were combined in a sequential and somewhat 
hierarchical manner, as the research strategy was largely qualitative (cf. Bryman 2008: 22). In 
taking the pragmatic view that research methods may be applied as technical tools, drawing 
from the advantages of each method, the current study rejects the position that quantitative 
and qualitative methods are epistemologically embedded and hence cannot be mixed (cf. 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, Bryman 2008). Because the aim was to ground the research 
in the context in which it was conducted, the qualitative strategy was considered justified to 
create space for the emergence of concepts and patterns in their interactions that were relevant 
in that context. Furthermore, it was considered that relying solely on quantitative methods, 
such as a structured survey involving brief, superficial interaction with a large number of 
respondents, would not be adequate for capturing such sensitive issues as people’s personal 
experiences and coping strategies following loss of assets, or intra-village political struggles. 
Limited quantification, mainly through descriptive statistics, was used to distil salient from 
anecdotal patterns of data (Bryman 2008: 599). The approach was iterative in alternating data 
collection and analysis (cf. Bryman 2008: 541-545).       
The first periods of field research in January 2008 and in March-May 2008 were focused on 
obtaining contextual and community level information to frame the study, and starting to 
identify patterns in the relationships between the attributes of various actors, governance 
processes and livelihood outcomes. The methods included unstructured and semi-structured 
group interviews with villagers in different roles regarding forest governance: village council 
and forest committee members, as well as ‘ordinary’ villagers, women and men. Apart from 
the interviews of the committees in which various members participated, groups were usually 
gender-segregated in order to provide women with a comfortable setting to talk. Participatory 
rural appraisal exercises conducted as part of the Landscape Mosaics project and the village 
land use planning processes, such as participatory mapping, seasonal calendars, historical 
timelines and functional analysis of land use types, provided additional information about 
tenure and resource access, livelihood activities and strategies, and social dynamics within the 
villages. Through key informant interviews with individuals that were particularly 
knowledgeable, or affected by the conservation interventions in particular ways, more detailed 
information was obtained. Although some of them became regular sources of information and 
updates in the course of the research, care was taken to avoid starting to see the world through 
their eyes only. To the extent possible, information that surfaced through the key informants 
was triangulated through other interviews or sources.  
In addition to the village level data collection, interviews with regional and local government 
and NGO representatives helped to broaden understanding of the conservation processes and 
the various actors involved, their interests and actions. A review of grey literature, such as 
project documents and unpublished research reports, was essential in obtaining an idea of the 
context in which the different conservation approaches operated at the study site, considering 
the specific history of forest governance in the East Usambaras and the multiple actors 
involved over the years.  Village forest management plans, by-laws, minutes of village forest 
committee meetings and records of village forest income and expenditure were used as data. 
Access to the files of the Derema Resettlement Action Plan project office in Muheza town 
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provided an opportunity to crosscheck the compensation sums mentioned by interviewees 
against the official records of paid compensation in Study I, in order to determine the 
accuracy of respondent recall.   
For an investigation of the intra-village social and political processes (esp. Study IV), it was 
important to observe the practices of deliberation, information sharing and village decision 
making. Direct observation in village council meetings, village assemblies and farmers’ 
meetings related to the Derema conservation and compensation process provided an idea of 
participation by different local actors, the types of issues communally discussed and positions 
held by various actors as well as their ‘voice’ in decision making. My role varied from that of 
“observer as participant”, when facilitating meetings or group exercises as Landscape 
Mosaics project staff, to that of “complete observer” in meetings where the researcher had no 
formal role, and did not intervene with the social interaction (cf. Gold 1957).  
In September-October 2008, a survey with 339 respondents across the five villages was 
carried out to collect data at household and individual level (Table 5). A minimum of seventy 
households were randomly drawn from a sampling frame including all households in each 
village, using the village office registers. In order to obtain information on how impacts of the 
conservation interventions were distributed between economic strata in the villages, a panel of 
key informants classified the sampled households in each village into groups of ‘high’, 
‘middle’ and ‘low’ wealth status according to indicators that they had previously defined 
based on values shared by most villagers.  The participants, men and women in equal 
numbers, were selected to represent the different parts of the village. They first defined 
indicators of wealth widely shared in the village context, which typically included the total 
area of land accessed for farming, the number of livestock (dairy cows) owned, and housing 
conditions (building materials, number of rooms). They also had to agree on the order of 
importance of the different indicators. The participants determined non-overlapping 
descriptions for the indicators in each wealth class. Drawing cards with the randomly sampled 
household names and discussing the situation of each household in relation to the pre-defined 
indicators, they assigned the households to wealth groups. The participants had to reach a 
consensus on the classification.  
Next, the panel determined different ways in which households had benefited or incurred 
costs due to the conservation interventions, and indicated the households to which the 
described experiences applied. The households were then divided into “mostly benefited”, 
“neutral” and “mostly incurred costs”. The first forty households, in the order that they had 
entered the random sample, were assigned into the resulting nine-cell sampling matrix (three 
values for wealth status times three values for conservation effects), so that the original 
proportions of each wealth class in the random sample were maintained, but a representation 
of the three types of conservation effects was achieved, if possible. From the reserve of 
remaining 30 households, substitute households could be drawn if a primary household could 
not be interviewed despite attempts on 3-4 consecutive days. 
Both spouses of a household were interviewed individually to enable comparison of 
responses, resulting in a slightly higher percentage of female respondents in the sample due to 
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female-headed single-parent households. In polygamous families, the first wife or the current 
co-habiting spouse of the husband was interviewed. It was stressed to the respondents that 
they should only answer a question on their own behalf and not for the overall situation of the 
household, and they were specifically told when the question concerned other members of the 
household.  
The survey questionnaire was designed to elicit data regarding access to resources (mainly 
land and forest), access to compensation in the case of the Derema corridor, livelihood 
strategies, and perceived impacts. The survey protocol was pre-tested in a third village, 
allowing adjustments and improvements before a team of enumerators (two local research 
assistants and four recent University of Dar es Salaam graduates) administered the survey in 
the study villages. The survey was administered in Swahili, spoken by virtually everybody in 
the study villages, under my supervision.  
Table 5. Survey sample in 2008.  
 Total n 
HH 
sampled 
Male respondents Female respondents 
n Age: 
median 
/min-max 
n Age: 
median 
/min-max 
Antakae 40 30 
 
40/ 29-81 38 
 
31/ 20-78 
Makanya 41 31 34/  21-64 35 26/ 20-80 
Kwatango 41 32 45/ 22-84 34 42/ 18-70 
Misalai 41 26 38/ 27-65 35 35/ 19-70 
Shambangeda 42 32 47/ 30-81 42 39/ 21-80 
 
Following partial analysis of the qualitative and survey data, further data collection in April 
2009 and September-October 2009 focused on interpreting and validating patterns of data 
with the villagers, principally through focus group discussions (mixed and gender-segregated 
groups) and key informant interviews. In complementing previous data, sampling was 
focused on certain individuals or groups by following specific emerging patterns of data (cf. 
theoretical sampling, Glaser and Strauss 2004). In the CBFM study villages, semi-structured 
group interviews were conducted with respondents that had indicated personal livelihood 
losses or gain because of CBFM in the 2008 survey. The views of the village leaders and 
forest committee members were also further probed. In the Derema villages, in-depth semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 31 respondents to the 2008 survey to observe 
further changes and impacts over a year after the final compensation, in September 2009. 
Relatively greater attention was given to people who had received no or very little 
compensation for lost access; they constituted half of the interviewees. Women were over-
represented in this group. The other half was split between interviewees who had received 
large sums of compensation and those in the ‘middle compensation’ category, based on 
quartiles of total compensation received according to the 2008 data. Site visits to people’s 
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homes and farms, some of them in new locations following displacement from the Derema 
corridor, helped understanding how the conservation approaches really played out in people’s 
lives, and how their responses shaped resource use in the surrounding landscape.     
The qualitative interviews in Swahili were carried out with the help of a local research 
assistant who functioned as an interpreter. He was from a local village (a neighbouring village 
to one of the study villages), an entrepreneurial farmer with secondary education, and also a 
trained tour guide of the Amani Nature Reserve who had worked with several ecologists and 
social scientists before. This probably raised his status in the villages, but the humble attitude 
with which he approached everybody made him well received and accepted. I was initially 
concerned with how a male research assistant would affect my interactions with female 
interviewees, which would be pivotal to my research objectives, and strived, but failed, to find 
a suitable female research assistant. Local women did not speak English sufficiently well to 
translate accurately, and I did not want to involve conservation project workers, or students 
who were not familiar with the local context. I soon realized that I had feared in vain, as the 
women appeared relaxed and un-intimidated by him in the interview situations. The 
advantages of my assistant, who was instrumental in finding the right people in the villages 
and introducing me, outweighed any possible bias. As our working relationship and my 
language skills developed, I became convinced that the translation was very accurate and that 
many times there was an unspoken understanding of what I ‘was after’. Furthermore, most of 
the interviews were recorded, and transcribing and translating them together provided a 
further means to control and improve the quality of the work.  
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4. Results  
4.1. Social impacts of compensated displacement from the Derema corridor 
(Study I) 
The main finding of this study was that the conservation intervention strengthened local social 
differentiation by failing to account for the social relations and previous access to resources 
that conditioned access to compensation, livelihood strategies, and finally the post-
displacement outcomes to different social groups. Women and the poorest farmers 
experienced the strongest negative impacts, whereas those who were previously better-off 
emerged as relative winners among the affected people. 
The most acutely felt changes as a consequence of the corridor establishment were related to 
decreased access to farmland. Seventy-nine percent of the survey respondents in Makanya and 
47% in Antakae had lost land to the Derema corridor. As anticipated (Jambiya and Sosovele 
2000), the distribution of land areas lost to the corridor was skewed towards smaller areas 
within the range of 0.1-5.0 ha; the median was one hectare. Although the area of land was not 
used as basis for the compensation calculation, there was a significant positive correlation 
(Spearman’s rho 0.426) between the area of farmland lost and the total compensation received 
over the years (one to three times per respondent, including the boundary compensation, 
2005, and the final compensation). The distribution of total amounts of compensation 
received was also highly skewed towards the smaller end of the huge range from less than 30 
to over 10,000 US dollars (Table 7). The changes in land access and compensation received 
per wealth class have been summarized in Table 6, combining the data from both villages. 
The median compensation in the highest wealth class was seven times higher than that in the 
lowest wealth class.  
Table 6. Lost access to land and access to compensation at the aggregate level of wealth 
groups (modified based on Table 2 in Study I).    
  Lowest (n=36) Middle (n=82) Highest (n=16) 
Percentage of those who 
lost land to the corridor  
58 57 100 
Median area of farmland 
lost (ha) 
0.4 1.2 1.0  
Median total compensation 
received (TZS) 
227,500  
(USD 190) 
360,000 
(USD 300) 
1,612,500 
(USD 1344) 
Note: Exchange rate used: USD 1 = TZS 1200 (2008).  
The importance of farmland for local livelihoods, and people’s cultural identity as farmers (cf. 
Feierman 1974), is perhaps reflected in that decreased access to forest products as a 
consequence of the Derema corridor establishment was not a salient feature in the qualitative 
data, although reported by 46% of the survey respondents. Many interviewees discounted the 
impacts on access to forest products as these were said to be available on farm (cf. Study III). 
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Indeed, the majority of those who did report reduced access responded by harvesting forest 
products on their remaining farms (48%) or by planting trees on farm (25%).     
Men and women were similarly affected in terms of restricted access to farmland, but men 
had far greater access to the monetary compensation (Table 7). Women’s land access 
consisted of land personally ‘owned’, according to the local concept of private ownership, as 
well as land accessed through joint ownership with their spouse, and land borrowed from 
other family members. According to the Shambaa custom, widows may act as custodians of 
land which formally belongs to the children of the deceased man. These relational 
mechanisms of land access became disputed in the compensation process, and women’s land 
rights were bypassed by male household heads or other male relatives who collected the 
compensation. They were thus dependent on the intra-household allocation of compensation 
and other remaining assets in the post-displacement situation. Comparison of data between 
spouses revealed that women’s access to and knowledge of the monetary compensation 
received by the household was restricted: in Antakae, nearly 60% of the interviewed women 
were not aware that their spouses had received compensation (15% in Makanya), and over 
90% did not know the amounts or uses of the compensation (in Makanya, 55% and 25%). The 
impacts of decreased access to land and compensation for women were compounded in cases 
where the family disintegrated following the receipt of the compensation payments, and 
indirect access to post-displacement assets was further reduced.  
Table 7. Gendered impacts on access to land and compensation (modified based on Table 3 in 
Study I).  
 Land lost to 
the corridor, 
median ha 
Received 
compensation 
for lost access 
Median total 
compensation 
Range 
Women  1.0 (n=40) 30%ª TZS 300,000 
(USD 250) (n=11) 
TZS 50,000 – 1,600,000 
(USD 42 – 1,333) 
Men  1.2 (n=45) 95% TZS 642,500 
(USD 535) (n=42) 
TZS 31,000 – 12,900,000 
(USD 26 – 10,750) 
ª The question concerned only land personally owned, but some respondents may have considered 
other types of access (see above) in answering the question.  
Exchange rate used: USD 1 = TZS 1200 (2008). 
Yet, there was variation regarding nature and intensity of the gendered impacts. Some women 
who had registered for the compensation themselves collected it and used it as they had 
planned, either independently or together with the husband. In other, especially the lowest 
wealth group households, overall access to both land and compensation was restricted, and the 
women bore their share of the consequences.   
The long time lag in the payments, previous greater land endowments and access to other 
resources, including social and human capital, were identified as the main factors that were 
likely to have influenced the way old and new assets were combined for livelihood strategies, 
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and subsequent livelihood outcomes to the different social groups. The perceived discrepancy 
between the economic importance of the corridor farm and the lump sum of monetary 
compensation, received after a long delay, was accentuated for the poorest farmers with small 
initial land endowments, whose compensation did not allow re-investment in land. In the 
lowest wealth group, the compensation was used almost entirely on consumption, including 
food, transport, clothes and health care.  Building or repair of residences ranked high as a use 
of the cash in all groups, indicating that improving their housing conditions was among the 
most urgent needs of the local population. In the lowest wealth group, and for many in the 
middle group, post-displacement livelihood strategy combined farming food crops on 
remaining land, typically more open land at lower elevations, and wage labour on neighbours’ 
farms. This suggests that these farmers were mainly resorting to temporary coping strategies 
rather than engaging in longer-term adaptive diversification.  
The lag not only impeded resource mobilization when needed, but probably also affected 
farmer decision making on the use of the cash compensation. EUCAMP had initially allowed 
harvesting of the corridor farms while producing, as long as they were not maintained, and 
cardamom from the corridor continued to contribute to the income of some farmers until as 
late as the end of 2008. The farmers were also aware of the plans included in the Resettlement 
Action Plan (URT 2006) to acquire and allocate alternative land to them in the lowlands. It is 
possible that these two factors influenced investments by those who did receive enough 
money to buy new farmland. It was not until 2009 when the cash compensation was finished, 
harvesting in the corridor ceased, and the land issue remained unsolved, that their resilience 
was put to test.   
The relatively better-off farmers, who had received considerable sums of compensation, 
invested in new farmland both in the uplands as well as in the lowlands, further diversifying 
their livelihood strategies. Income from the remaining, producing cardamom farms was used 
to develop the new land. In addition, they invested in diverse businesses, such as shops, rental 
houses and functioning as middle-men in the local agricultural value chain. These relative 
winners of the conservation intervention could be characterized as entrepreneurs who used the 
additional cash input to realize existing plans. They were an exception among the affected 
people in expressing content with the conservation and compensation process and the 
associated personal gain.  
4.2. Governance processes shaping post-displacement livelihood impacts (Study 
II) 
The way the Derema conservation and compensation process played out for different affected 
social groups was shaped by departures from initial plans, agreements and the relevant 
policies, compounded by structural challenges related to the project setting for implementing 
the intervention. Inadequate access to information and other resources set limits to the agency 
of those affected in the aggregate, and contributed to unequal conditions of claiming and 
defending access within the affected population.    
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Despite widespread concerns about the effects of displacement evident during the Social 
Impact Assessment in 2000, villagers’ apparent support for the establishment of the 
exclusionary government reserve was subsequently reported (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, 
Pohjonen 2002). Yet, only a handful of villagers had direct access to the negotiations with the 
representatives of EUCAMP and the government. Many of the interviewees in the villages, 
especially women, felt that they had not participated in making the decision about the corridor 
(Table 8). Those who represented other villagers in the negotiations, and later in following up 
on the compensation, were usually older, more affluent men in leadership positions in the 
villages. Considering that the intervention finally only benefited the wealthy farmers who 
were able to make investments with the compensation (Study I), it is likely that this group 
was motivated to promote certain approaches over others, such as displacement with 
monetary compensation instead of village forest reserves, and cash compensation as personal 
cheques instead of other forms of compensation. Perhaps due to a cultural bias, the 
preferences of the male leaders turned out to have a bigger weight in the consultations with 
the conservation officials. Although women’s voices were heard and documented at the start 
of the intervention (cf. Jambiya and Sosovele 2000), their requests for a compensation 
approach that would take the gendered land access into account were not considered at any 
point of the process. Nevertheless, expectations of prompt and considerable compensation 
based on what was received for the crops on the corridor boundary – TZS 28,000 (approx. 
USD 35 in 2001) per plant – may have initially worked in favour of general support for the 
cash compensation method in the villages.             
Table 8. Participation in the decision about the Derema corridor and the selection of village 
representatives, and information flows in the two study villages according to the survey 
conducted in 2008.   
Gender Village 
Participated in 
making the 
decision about 
the corridor 
(%) Found out about the corridor through (%) 
Participated in 
selecting the 
members of the 
follow-up 
committee (%) 
  Yes No Village 
assembly 
Family, 
neighbours 
Village 
leaders 
Otherª Yes No 
Women 
(n=75) 
Antakae 
(n=39) 
15 85 46 44 8 2 10 90 
 Makanya 
(n=36) 
6 94 17 64 3 16 11 89 
Men 
(n=63) 
Antakae 
(n=31) 
35 65 61 23 0 16 36 64 
 Makanya 
(n=32) 
62 38 56 3 9 32 75 25 
ª Researchers, forestry staff, other external contacts. 
As the conservation and compensation process lagged on, frustration and dissatisfaction 
became widespread in the villages. By 2005, the affected farmers from the five villages had 
organized themselves in a committee that visited the district and regional forestry offices 
several times in an attempt to obtain information on the status of compensation, and to exert 
51 
 
pressure on the authorities. In doing so, the farmers utilized their broader social networks of 
people that they thought to be in positions to influence the process. Researchers working in 
the area and interested in the conservation process, such as myself, were perceived as 
potential messengers to whom the villagers vented their frustration. Discursive means of 
resistance included threats of slashing the regenerating forest vegetation and taking back the 
land by force unless the money was paid, and repeated portrayals of the affected people as the 
impoverished victims of the conservation intervention. New information was employed in this 
struggle as it became available, such as when the farmers became aware of their legal right to 
compensation for the land, in addition to the crops, in 2009.   
Access to information turned out to be a key variable shaping the process for nearly all the 
actors involved. The agency of the farmers’ committee was undermined by repeated failures 
to acquire relevant information, as well as by lack of knowledge of the responsible authorities 
or the institutional accountability measures available. For example, whereas virtually all 
interviewees deemed the final compensation received in 2008 insufficient and less than they 
had expected based on their own calculations, the World Bank project received very few 
reclamations during a three-week grievance period in November 2008 (A. Kijazi, Pers. 
comm., September 2009). It is possible that the objections to the compensation sums were 
part of the discursive resistance, but interviewees in the villages claimed not to have been 
aware of the opportunity or the procedures to file formal complaints.  
Although the farmers’ follow up committee was considered a legitimate representative of the 
majority of the survey respondents who were aware of it – most female interviewees were not, 
cf. Table 8 – the trust eroded among some people due to the inability of the committee to 
influence and speed up the process. This was probably fuelled by the general frustration of 
people with the process, growing distrust of the authorities’ willingness or capabilities to 
finalize the payments, and disappointment over the amount of compensation when it was 
finally received. Misunderstandings contributed to the confusion, when the flow of 
information to most of the affected relied on sporadic encounters between the conservation 
implementers and village leaders. It gave some actors space to manipulate the situation to 
their advantage, and whether deliberate or not, varying interpretations of what had been 
agreed, or not, were presented. Especially women, whose access to village assemblies is 
restricted particularly in the case of remote subvillages such as Makanya (cf. Table 8), often 
relied on second-hand information and rumours concerning the conservation and 
compensation process.  
The actors behind the conservation intervention – EUCAMP officials, government forest 
officers and the World Bank project staff in the last phase – may have similarly operated 
amidst uncertainty and with restricted knowledge. Indications of unpreparedness and unclear 
locus of responsibility over the intervention that was started by a foreign-funded development 
project, with subsequent discontinuities in the involvement of the implementing actors, may 
be observed throughout the process. They are evident especially in the actions of EUCAMP 
(cf. Pohjonen 2002, Sjöholm et al. 2001), but it is unclear why the departures from the 
applicable legal and policy provisions were maintained even after comprehensive studies by 
consultants in preparation for the World Bank funding, or why the bureaucratic complications 
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in the land allocation in the lowlands were not better prepared for, even if anticipated (cf. 
URT 2006: 24-25).  
4.3. Community-Based Forest Management: re-allocation of forest rights and 
livelihood outcomes (Study III) 
A comparison of the Community-Based Forest Management policy expectations (cf. Section 
3.1.1.) to experiences of implementation in the context of the East Usambara villages 
demonstrated that the more secure forest rights have largely not translated into livelihood 
benefits for the participating villagers. The CBFM implementation follows the model of 
exclusionary forest management within village forest reserves, heavily orientated towards 
conservation and forest regeneration.  
Figure 4 summarizes the practices of re-allocation of bundles of rights related to forest 
resources, including land, in the East Usambaran villages engaging in CBFM. De jure rights 
to withdraw and manage resources and exclude others have been devolved from the central 
and local (district) governments to the village councils through the establishment of the 
village forest reserves. But the enforcement of VFR management plans and by-laws has also 
meant that many customary rights to forest resources previously held by individuals and 
families have ceased to exist. Although VFR establishment is primarily intended to take place 
on communal land, in all study villages it has involved the appropriation of privately held 
farmland to some extent. Certain forms of resource use, such as collection of firewood, wild 
vegetables and medicine, remain officially allowed in the VFR regulations, but stricter rules 
are applied in practice. Levels of knowledge about the village forest rules among survey 
respondents with no direct role in village forest management in three villages (n=153) were 
low; nearly a third could not say whether certain activities were allowed or not in the VFR. A 
comparison of the survey data revealed that 86% of the forest committee members (n=21) 
interpreted officially allowed activities to be forbidden, compared to 63% of the other 
respondents.   
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Figure 4. Reallocation of forest rights as a result of CBFM establishment in East Usambara 
Mountains villages. The format of the graph has been modified based on Barry and Meinzen-
Dick (2008: 18) and populated with findings from the current research. (Key: bold= de jure 
rights; oblique= de facto rights/practices. Solid, right-facing arrows: rights devolution; 
dashed, left-facing arrows: rights revocation.)  
Yet less than 20% of the survey respondents in the study villages reported restricted access to 
forest resources as a consequence of CBFM. This is explained by the diversity of sources of 
forest products which are collected principally on own and neighbours’ farms; timber, 
building materials and firewood are reportedly still available in the agroforestry systems. All 
of those who had experienced restricted access responded by shifting harvesting from the 
village forest area to farms and tea company forests. The importance of access to resources in 
these alternative areas is accentuated for those who have little or no own farmland, such as the 
part of the population in the upland villages that relies on tea picking as the main livelihood 
activity. However, experienced restrictions or other negative impacts of CBFM were not 
associated with e.g. the wealth status of the survey respondents.   
In general, a minority of villagers associated any problems with the establishment and 
implementation of the village forest reserves (Figure 5). The most salient concerns were 
related to the incidents of land appropriation, as well as damage to crops by forest wildlife, 
seen to have increased following the VFR establishment. Among those affected that were 
interviewed, loss of land seems to have focused on farmers with slightly larger land 
endowments than the village average, which may have mitigated the experienced opportunity 
costs. Nonetheless, the farmers indicated strong dissatisfaction and livelihood losses due to 
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the annexation, although lacking data prior to the intervention precluded quantification of any 
costs. Crop raiding by wildlife, such as monkeys and rats, was suggested to have increased the 
labour cost of farming next to the forest, as especially women and children had to keep watch 
on farms. 
    
 
Figure 5. General/personal benefits and problems associated with village forest reserves, 
based on coded responses to open-ended questions by survey respondents (n=198) in three 
study villages (modified based on Figures 2 and 3 in Study III).  
The benefits from CBFM are mainly associated with indirect conservation values (Figure 5). 
Forests are seen as the source of rain and water, essential for agriculture and subsistence. 
Some interviewees suggested that the environmental conditions in the village area had already 
improved because of the village forest reserve. Conservation of wildlife is expected to attract 
tourism, a potential future income source. Although direct returns from forest products are 
currently negligible, as the village forest rules prevent any extractive use, some interviewees 
had the idea of future harvesting of, for instance, timber. An exception in the current situation 
is butterfly farming (part of Non-Timber Forest Products, NTFPs, in Figure 5), which 
constitutes a significant income source for those involved (among the study villages, in 
Shambangeda and Kwezitu) and a strong incentive to promote forest conservation (cf. 
Morgan-Brown et al. 2010).      
Yearly direct revenue from CBFM to the six study villages, recorded in the books of the 
forest committees, ranged from TZS 0 to 180,000 (USD 120; 2011) in 2008-2011; the median 
annual income was zero. The sporadic income consisted mostly of VFR entry fees paid by 
researchers and other visitors, as well as a few fines paid by villagers that had been caught 
breaking the by-laws. Hence most of the time, there is no communal forest income to offset 
the transaction costs that the involved villagers, committee members and forest guards, incur 
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from CBFM implementing activities, such as participating in meetings and patrolling the 
forest. Decreased motivation due to lack of compensation and equipment, even rain boots and 
basic tools, were reported by all forest committees. In Mgambo village, income from a pilot 
REDD+ research project had contributed to a conflict between the forest committee and 
village leaders, and in 2009, it was debated whether the money had been disbursed and where 
it had gone.             
4.4. Legitimacy, collective action and sustainability of Community-Based Forest 
Management (Study IV) 
This study investigated the social and political processes of CBFM establishment and 
implementation in order to explain the observed strict village forest rules, forfeited benefits 
and asymmetric distribution of costs (cf. Study III), comparing national policies to practices 
in the East Usambara villages. The input legitimacy of CBFM regimes was assessed focusing 
on the parameters of inclusion, representation, deliberation and accountability, seen as central 
to the theoretical linkages between forest rights devolution and expectations of sustainable 
community forest management. 
Table 9 summarizes the legal and policy provisions guiding the establishment and 
implementation of CBFM and the corresponding practices in the study villages. Whereas the 
law (Forest Act 2002) defines the process in quite general terms, detailed recommendations 
for each step have been included in the national CBFM guidelines (URT 2007). The East 
Usambara practices largely follow the approach of the guidelines. Initiation and 
implementation rely heavily on the support by TFCG. District staff has been engaged through 
sponsorship by the TFCG/WWF project in the facilitation of village land use planning. The 
district officials lament inadequate resources to allow them to regularly carry out their tasks, 
although they have been allocated support through the National Forest Program specifically 
for CBFM.  
Table 9. Policy and practice in CBFM establishment and implementation.      
Steps in CBFM 
establishment 
and 
implementation 
Relevant legal and policy provisions (Forest Act 
2002, national CBFM Guidelines, URT 2007)  
East Usambara practices 
1. Initiation Guidelines: “takes place at the district level, with the 
selection of villages and briefing of district staff, plus 
the formation of a team of staff with different skills 
to do the work”, followed by meetings with the 
village council and village assembly (p. 11) 
Village land must be defined (p. 6); boundary 
surveying & agreement with surrounding entities 
sufficient (p. 6, 11) 
TFCG-WWF project has approached 
villages and proposed CBFM to the 
village council which has introduced 
the idea to the village assembly.  
Completed village land-use planning 
taken as a pre-requisite for CBFM 
establishment.   
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2. Election of a 
Village Natural 
Resource 
Management 
Committee 
 
Law: Village Natural Resource Committee is elected 
by the village assembly; gender-balanced; the 
principal body concerned with the management of the 
Village Land Forest Reserve; accountable to the 
village assembly on a regular basis  (Section 33 (1), 
(2)) 
Guidelines lists additional instructions regarding the 
election of the committee (p.15) 
“Forest committees” (Swa. kamati ya 
msitu) have been selected in the 
village assemblies. Gender ratio most 
frequently 7 female + 8 male 
members.  
3. Village forest 
boundary 
surveying 
Guidelines: to be done carefully and as inclusively as 
possible ‘… to avoid displacing people or causing 
conflicts later’ (p. 16)  
Crucial step in the process; has 
caused conflicts in the study villages 
as the boundaries have been drawn to 
include some private farmland. 
4. Development 
of a village 
forest 
management 
plan  
Law: village council shall consult users and user 
groups as well as local authorities to ensure broad 
support (Section 14 (1))  
Guidelines: participatory forest resource assessment 
as basis for the plan (p. 16-21); management 
objectives defined; proposes questions to be 
considered to define ‘if harvesting is an option’ (p. 
20)  
TFCG facilitated planning with a 
group of volunteers from the village, 
often later formalized as members of 
the forest committee. Management 
plans in all villages highly congruent 
and focused on conservation and 
regeneration.  
5. Preparation of 
village forest 
rules (by-laws) 
 
 
Law: village forest reserve is to be managed 
according to by-laws that may be made by the village 
council, or according to local customary rules and 
practices (Section 34 (4); emphasis added) 
Guidelines: the village must prepare bylaws, 
approved by the village assembly (p. 8; emphasis 
added); district technical consultation (p. 23) 
By-laws prepared by ‘village leaders’ 
(village council and forest 
committee); other villagers informed 
through the village assembly.  
At the district approval stage, 
different villages’ by-laws have been 
homogenized in an annex attached to 
the management plans.   
6. Declaration of 
the village forest 
reserve 
 
Law: village assembly approves the management 
plan and by-laws; registered in the district (Section 
34) 
Guidelines: District council approval required for the 
management plan and by-laws following village 
assembly approval (p. 23-26) 
Guidelines followed; final district 
approval has been a bottleneck and 
slowed down the establishment of the 
village forest reserves.   
7. 
Implementation 
 
 
Law: as per management plan and by-laws (Section 
34) 
Guidelines: committee shall be effective in 
awareness-raising, forest patrolling, monitoring and 
record-keeping, dealing with ‘forest encroachment’, 
rehabilitation (p. 27-29); district to supervise (p. 11) 
Guidelines followed; support and 
monitoring by TFCG. Management 
consolidated in the forest committee; 
limited participation by other 
villagers. 
8. Revision and 
gazetting 
 
Guidelines: after three years, the management plan 
and by-laws should be reviewed and revised; the 
village council may also request the village forest 
reserve to be gazette, but this is optional (p. 11) 
(No reviews or revisions had yet 
taken place during data collection) 
 
In practice, the establishment and implementation of CBFM rests on a small sub-set of 
villagers. Although it was generally agreed that the decision on CBFM initiation had been 
made in the village assembly, ownership over the decisions adopted in the assemblies may be 
reduced by regular absenteeism for a number of reasons. This is especially true for women, 
who are often unable to allocate time for public participation from domestic chores and 
farming (cf. Study II). One third of the female respondents in 2008 had not attended any 
assembly in the past 12 months, in comparison to men, 85% of whom had attended at least 
one. Participation fatigue, due to a perceived disconnect between various village meetings and 
57 
 
discussions, and subsequent implementation – or rather, non-implementation – of decisions 
and plans, was also reported as a reason for not attending the assemblies. On average, around 
13% of female survey respondents and about a third of the male respondents considered that 
they had participated in making the decision about the village forest reserve, in the election of 
the forest committee, or in the making of the village forest rules (Table 10).          
Table 10. Participation in village forestry decision making by female (F, n=110) and male (M, 
n=87) survey respondents in three villages.  
Participated in making 
the decision about the 
VFR (%) 
Participated in the 
election of the forest 
committee (%) 
Participated in 
making forest rules 
(%) 
Participated in the 
election of the current 
village council (%) 
F M F M F M F M 
13 39 16 32 10 30 39 57 
     
When survey respondents were asked to grade the performance of the village council and 
forest committee of their village, most people rated the management of public affairs between 
average and good. Yet 84% of the interviewed women and 51% of the men did not know who 
the forest committee members were. A disconnect between personal interests and the 
proposals and decisions of the village government and the forest committee was reported 
especially by the interviewees who had been affected negatively by land appropriation for the 
VFR.  
The legitimacy deficits are perhaps most obvious in relation to the deliberative quality of the 
CBFM processes. The village assembly, gathering villagers typically from 3-4 subvillages, 
some several kilometres from the village centre, does not appear to work very well as the 
main arena for public deliberation. The communication in the assemblies witnessed 
functioned primarily one-way from the village leaders to the public. Only confident 
individuals – reportedly most of the interviewed men but less than half of the women – were 
able to voice their concerns. Yet the principle of decision making is majority rule, and 
assembly decisions are considered legitimate even if the participants are mainly silent 
listeners. This was considered a problem especially by women who preferred sub-village 
meetings and more indirect ways of contributing their ideas. Interestingly, the involved 
women considered that participation in the forest committee had given them more direct 
opportunities to influence decision making, which in turn had given them confidence to speak 
in the village assemblies.  
Accountability is compromised due to unawareness among villagers of their procedural rights, 
especially regarding redress mechanisms. Most of those who were dissatisfied with the VFR 
boundary decisions and land appropriation did not see any means to contest the decisions. The 
case of one farmer who sought redress outside the village demonstrated that going against 
those in power in the community meant taking the risk of repercussions and losing one’s 
social status.    
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What makes one a leader, then, or politically active? Contrary to predictions based on 
previous literature (Section 2.3), holding a position in the village governing structures (village 
council or committee membership) was not significantly associated with such pre-defined 
attributes as gender, age, education, wealth status, or subvillage (location of residence) in 
either qualitative or quantitative data. It was observed, though, that village chairpersons as 
well as forest committee chairpersons and secretaries were male, while women constituted 
half of the council or committee membership, as stipulated by the law. Moreover, it was 
suggested – although this was not measured in the survey − that the representatives still most 
frequently belonged to the ranks of the ruling party CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi or ‘Party of 
the Revolution’) despite the introduction of the multi-party system in the early 1990s. 
According to the interviewees, being confident, talkative and ‘already active’ in communal 
affairs were the most determining characteristics for someone to be elected for representative 
positions. As such, someone with confidence – and importantly, resources – to pursue 
political inclinations could hold positions over and over again, especially if participation 
further empowered them, as suggested by the forest committee members.  
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5. Discussion  
In this section, the implications of the studies for the further development of forest 
conservation approaches are discussed on a general level. More detailed discussion on the 
case-specific findings of Studies I-IV may be found in the original articles. First, the research 
approach and process is evaluated critically.   
5.1. Evaluating the research approach  
The research questions of the current study were informed by contemporary academic and 
policy debates, such as those related to the negative social impacts of protected areas and the 
comparative advantages of various institutional designs for building forest-based climate 
change mitigation on. At the same time, they were also motivated by questions of values (the 
quest to enhance equity of resource access in the developing tropics) and more pragmatic 
concerns (e.g. the opportunity to study the Derema conservation process and its peculiarities). 
In a similar vein, the research approach was not only informed by what was considered 
appropriate in light of my understanding of the phenomena to be studied, but by what was 
practically possible. Absence of reliable data from before the interventions precluded a quasi-
experimental before-after design, although previous information was used to frame the study. 
For instance, a considerable effort was made to recover the original data of the 2000 Derema 
Social Impact Assessment (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000), but to no avail. The current 
approach was thus focused on pursuing the key patterns of interactions between locally 
relevant variables and the associated outcomes following conservation establishment. In the 
process, the theoretical sampling was not only driven by purely empirical findings from the 
field, but also by my growing understanding of the contemporary theoretical puzzles and 
debates, the ideas of which became intertwined with those arising from the data. An earlier 
exposure to some of these ideas could have helped me sharpen the research focus and  define 
my ‘niche’ in relation to other researchers interested in similar topics, in order to address the 
concurrent academic and policy debates in a more targeted way. Moreover, the study would 
have benefited from the strengthening of my methodological skills through graduate studies at 
an early stage of the research process, as opposed to the middle and late stages, as dictated by 
the juggling of work and study.  
The step-wise approach, alternating the use of qualitative methods with limited quantification, 
proved fruitful for “combating anecdotalism” (Bryman 2008: 599), uncovering unexpected 
patterns of data, and clarifying apparent paradoxes. In the absence of comparable data prior to 
the interventions, the study relied heavily on perception-based data in assessing changes. The 
risks of perception-based methods relate to the tendencies of respondents to answer questions 
according to their recall abilities and understanding of concepts, which may vary widely even 
if specific attention is paid to the way questions are formulated and concepts explained to 
respondents. They may also answer strategically depending on their understanding of the 
purpose of the research or the benefits that may be derived from it (Lund et al. 2009, 
Margoluis et al. 2009).  
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Triangulation of the interview data proved necessary for two principle reasons that are likely 
to have filtered the information that people contributed. First, in the Derema case, as 
mentioned, the atmosphere in the villages in the beginning of the research was tense because 
of the pending compensation, and visitors such as researchers were seen as potential 
messengers of the anguish of the affected villagers (cf. Study II). Following the final 
compensation payments, most people, minus those who received the largest sums, were 
disappointed with what they had received. This was another reason for attempting to maintain 
discursive channels to the authorities and donors. In the last phase of fieldwork, the pending 
allocation of alternative land to the affected farmers was the most burning issue which had to 
be shared first before anything else could be discussed.  
Second, whereas in the Derema villages I could somehow distance myself from the 
conservation implementers and portray myself as an impartial researcher, especially as the 
rapport with the villagers developed, in the CBFM villages the situation was more 
complicated due to the two hats that I was wearing. Participating in the activities of the 
Landscape Mosaics project, frequently together with TFCG and district staff, at times 
involving a larger group of people and the use of an ICRAF vehicle, is almost certain to have 
influenced the data collected to some degree. Pro-conservation statements which echo the 
discourse of conservation staff as well as that of the village leaders (cf. Study IV) were 
especially salient in the survey data, collected by enumerators that had only a brief time to 
interact with the interviewees. Although care needs to be taken not to discount any 
endogenous reasons that people may have to support forest conservation, it is possible that the 
association of the research team with conservation establishment made them cite more pro-
conservation opinions and actions than would have otherwise been the case.     
A comparison of the compensation sums cited by survey respondents and those paid to the 
same people according to the records kept at the Muheza district office provided some 
indication that respondent recall in the Derema villages was fairly accurate and the responses 
aimed to be truthful. The median difference between the total compensation reported by 
respondents and compensation paid according to district records was TZS 153,610 (USD 128, 
n=414). The greatest differences were mainly for recipients of relatively large compensation 
payments over several years.  The median difference between sums reported as the final 
payment in 2008 (the same year as the research was conducted, i.e. recent for the respondents 
to remember) and the payment records was negligible; TZS 42,909 (USD 36).  
The most obvious internal validity problem encountered was with the wealth classification 
exercise in the Derema villages. Since the exercise took place sometime after compensation 
had been received, the key informants were asked whether the compensation benefits had 
                                                      
4 The cross-checking could not be done for the whole sample, as identifying the interviewed farmers among the 
1000+ names in the district records posed challenges. People had sometimes used a partially different name in 
signing up for the compensation from what they reported in the interviews. Some names were repeated in the 
records, organized by farm and not by farmer, because compensation was collected for various farms. However, 
in many cases the names slightly differed, either because of a spelling or a recording mistake, or because there 
were two different people with almost the same name. This made it difficult to aggregate data on compensation 
received at the level of individual farmers.  
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affected the placement of some households in the highest class, which was subsequently used 
for identifying the socially stratified impacts. They insisted that they had used the agreed 
criteria and the current situation of any given household as the basis for the classification. Yet 
the current status could be a combination of assets possessed prior to the compensation and 
acquired after it. Interviews with the classified households also suggested that other implicit 
views, in addition to the formal criteria, might have affected the outcomes of the exercise. For 
example, alcoholism appeared to have lowered the wealth category of a household in spite of, 
for example, area of land accessed. However, tracing the patterns of livelihood activities and 
outcomes for the various groups through 2008 and 2009 supported the main patterns of the 
wealth class specific results. 
Finally, it should be noted that while I was very aware of being perceived as a potential 
messenger of the Derema villagers’ cause and consciously strived to maintain some degree of 
‘scientific neutrality’, it was challenging to remain unmoved by the stories and experiences 
encountered. This was not always possible, especially in the case of people who had got ‘the 
short end of the stick’ in the process.  
5.2. Governance and social outcomes in forest conservation: critical factors  
5.2.1. Exclusionary protected areas and compensated displacement 
Despite the controversy attached to exclusionary conservation and its human impacts, 
protected areas are likely to remain one of the main approaches to sustain the world’s tropical 
forests, their biodiversity and the derived environmental services. Globally agreed targets in 
the Programme of Work on Protected Areas of the Convention on Biological Diversity aim at 
the creation of a global network of comprehensive, representative and effectively managed 
national and regional protected area system (Coad et al. 2009; http://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/). 
A recent report confirms that globally, protected areas are growing in number and coverage 
(Bertzky et al. 2012). Although other approaches are being developed, the conservation of 
certain fragile ecosystems may necessitate varying degrees of access restrictions, continuing 
the exclusionary tradition. Still, consensus in the academic and policy debates has long come 
to a head about the need to strive to minimize the negative social impacts of exclusionary 
conservation, especially for the already vulnerable populations. The questions of how, to 
whom and by whom the costs of conservation should be compensated are now at the centre of 
the ‘people and parks’ debate. 
Compensation for the taking of resource rights has been likened to direct payments for 
conservation (Wilkie et al. 2010), promoted as an affordable and cost-effective conservation 
instrument with growing evidence from the developed world (Ferraro 2002, Ferraro and 
Simpson 2002). Nevertheless, Ferraro and Simpson (2002: 1718) note: “potential obstacles to 
implementing a direct payment approach in developing nations include uncertain or 
inequitable land tenure, limited experience with and enforcement of legal contracts, and 
limited local opportunities for nonagricultural investment or employment”. These and other 
related obstacles are not insignificant, and will be discussed in the following, reflecting on the 
lessons learned from the case of the Derema corridor. First, however, the conceptual 
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difference between compensation for displacement and/or resettlement, and compensation for 
the medium or long-term delivery of environmental services must be reiterated. The Derema 
corridor compensation intervention represented the kind of one-off compensation for the 
permanent taking of resource rights that the national legislation in many countries, such as the 
Tanzanian land and forest laws, or the guidelines of international organizations, such as the 
Operational Policy 4.12 of the World Bank or the OECD Guidelines for Aid Agencies on 
Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in Development Projects 
(http://www.oecd.org/environment/environmentanddevelopment/1887708.pdf, accessed 27 
August 2012) determine. Payments for environmental services schemes (or ‘compensation 
and rewards’ for environmental services, Swallow et al. 2009) usually entail a series of 
payments regularly spaced out in time, conditional upon the verified delivery of the 
contracted services by the sellers, who remain the resource rights holders (e.g. Wunder 2006). 
Importantly, participation in PES schemes is (ostensibly) voluntary (Wunder 2006, Swallow 
et al. 2009), whereas displacement for conservation or development frequently is not. Even if 
it was framed as voluntary, in practice such physical or discursive conditions may be created 
that the affected do not have the real choice to withhold consent or to not relocate (Baird and 
Shoemaker 2007, Dear and McCool 2010). While some of the reservations discussed in the 
following apply to both types of compensation, the literature points to important implications 
of these differences for the social outcomes of the two approaches.  
In Europe and North America, property and resource rights are usually well defined, resting 
on statutory laws with wide bases of legitimacy. In contrast, in post-colonial states in the 
tropics, including sub-Saharan Africa, legal pluralism and overlapping resource claims are 
rife. Complex land and forest access patterns exist within communities, kinship groups and 
households, complicating the task of unequivocally identifying rights holders entitled to 
compensation if those rights are ruptured. Whether for land acquisition or for a rewards for 
environmental services scheme, land registration based on Western concepts of ownership 
may not capture dynamic local realities of land access, and entail the risk of further 
marginalizing those that do not have the ‘voice’ to defend their interests. The Derema study is 
no rarity in documenting a land registration process in Tanzania or in Africa that ended up 
affecting women’s resource access negatively (cf. Gray and Kevane 1999, Odgaard 2002, 
Yngstrom 2002, Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Interventions that rely on expectations of 
unaided intra-household transfers for the equitable distribution of compensation run 
considerable risks of far-reaching social consequences, based on evidence from this study and 
other studies on household resource allocation and contribution (Bruce 1989, Katz 1995).  
Yet it would be inaccurate to portray women or other disadvantaged groups as mere passive 
victims in struggles for access. In the Derema process, despite the disparity in opportunities 
compared to men, the women did try to influence the process through the means available. 
Their concerns became documented in the studies and consultations carried out, although 
never effectively incorporated into the planning and implementation of the intervention. The 
case is illustrative of how dynamic bundles of powers mediate the opportunities for different 
actors to defend their interests, and the same time, those opportunities are also shaped by the 
structures for information sharing, consultation and negotiation availed. This is another 
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important observation for implementing direct payments for conservation based on models 
and experiences from the developed world. Discrepancies in access to information, 
transparency of governance, and levels of education remain considerable between residents of 
the global North and South. Subsequently, landholders in the former – women and men – are 
in a better position to claim and exercise their rights, determine adequate levels of 
compensation, and seek redress when conservation decisions are unsatisfactory. They are also 
more likely to receive unbiased and professional assistance from the authorities in doing so. 
The Derema farmers encountered resistance to their efforts to influence the process, but 
strategically incorporated new knowledge into their arguments and actions, illustrative of how 
actors often actively employ different interpretations of concepts and ideas in their attempt to 
influence and enact processes (cf. Sikor and Lund 2009). It is plausible to assume that an 
intervention with a longer time frame, such as a PES scheme, offers different actors extended 
opportunities to ‘catch up’ on others in terms of powers to influence the negotiations over 
resource control, compared to one-off deals of compensated displacement, especially if the 
goals of mutual learning and empowerment are explicitly part of the approach. The fact that 
the Derema corridor establishment was intended to be implemented as a punctual top-down 
operation of resource rights reallocation from the farmers to the state with the associated one-
time compensation, but the process was unexpectedly extended, probably undermined any 
willingness by the authorities to re-open it for negotiations or to take the farmers’ political 
mobilization seriously.      
It is easy to point out the flaws in the planning and implementation of the Derema corridor 
intervention, and attribute many of the negative social impacts to its shortcomings, such as the 
time lag in the compensation payments. Would the negative impacts have been avoided if the 
intervention had followed the relevant policies more closely? First, it should be noted that the 
current case is by far not the first documented incidence of displacement, for conservation or 
for development, to have been marred by poor planning and implementation (cf. Cernea and 
Guggenheim 1993, Cernea and Mathur 2008). Rather, there appear to be systemic challenges 
that hamper the application of compensation policies time and again. An evaluation of the 
World Bank policy on resettlement in the mid-1980s revealed that the policy was not applied 
consistently, and many of the legitimacy and social performance deficits of development-
induced displacement that had contributed to the policy development in the first place were 
still abound. The review concluded that the capacities of the implementing agencies in the 
recipient countries were inadequate, and the bank’s supervision was insufficient. Furthermore, 
viable economic and social options for rehabilitating the livelihoods of the displaced were 
inadequately planned and financed (Cernea 1993). These findings resonate strikingly with the 
outcomes of another World Bank funded intervention, the completion of the establishment of 
the Derema corridor, twenty years later.  
Black’s (2008) observations on the challenges of legitimacy and accountability in polycentric 
regimes may be relevant for explaining the persistent problems in applying displacement and 
resettlement policies. Compensation and resettlement interventions are frequently 
implemented in project or development aid settings that may be considered polycentric in that 
they involve multiple actors with complex webs of interdependencies, lacking a central locus 
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of authority. Whose rules or norms are to be followed, when one set of actors defines the 
goals and modalities of an intervention, formal ownership over the process is assigned to 
another, and a third set of actors is to provide the funding? Who oversees the enforcement of 
mutually agreed rules; who is accountable to whom? These are of course questions pertinent 
to a broader discussion on the legitimacy and effectiveness of development aid, but relevant 
for any further plans of compensated displacement for conservation, which are likely to 
continue to involve multiple transnational actors. Recent global policy discussions on REDD+ 
demonstrate that governments of tropical developing countries consider that they do not have 
the resources, or the political will, to implement forest conservation unaided by financial 
flows from developed nations (e.g. Isenberg and Potvin 2010).  
Second, the principle of monetary compensation for the taking of resource rights warrants 
further attention. The approach has come under growing scrutiny by scholars following 
countless ‘unsuccess stories’ of compensated displacement since the 1970s (Cernea 2003, 
Kanbur 2003, Cernea and Mathur 2008). Failures to achieve pre-displacement levels of well-
being among the affected by monetary compensation have been attributed to  
1) underestimation or under-valuation of assets for which compensation is due, and 
consequent partial or non-replacement of lost assets; 
2) difficulty in monetizing non-physical losses and failure to account for non-market income 
and costs; 
3) under-compensation resulting from the late disbursement of compensation to those who are 
left assetless for an unacceptable time period; 
4) elite capture of compensation money before it reaches those rightfully entitled; 
5) asset appreciation occurring after the determination of compensation, diminishing the 
purchasing/asset restitution power of compensation recipients; and  
6) misuse of compensation money by recipients unaccustomed to handling cash, who are as a 
result quickly left both assetless and cashless (Cernea 2003: 41). 
 
The Tanzanian law or the applicable guidelines of the financial institutions do not dictate the 
compensation for lost access to be monetary; rather, they give considerable room for the 
parties to agree on the suitable form of compensation (hence drawing attention to questions of 
unequal agency and quality of representation among the affected). The Derema farmers 
reportedly preferred cash, although it is not clear which other options were discussed, when 
and with whom (Study II). It is quick to point out that many of the listed observations above 
applied to the Derema process. But leaving point (6) aside for a moment, what if the 
intervention had involved full, fair and timely cash compensation for the affected? 
Not all cash is necessarily bad. Direct cash transfer programs in Latin America have had 
encouraging results in contributing to the economies of poor households, and evidence of the 
positive impacts of similar programs in Africa is starting to emerge (Davis et al. 2012). In 
Malawi, a national cash transfer scheme involving monthly payments has been shown to 
generate economic development impacts, reducing negative coping strategies among the 
poorest beneficiaries (Covarrubias et al. 2012). The obvious difference between these 
programs and one-off cash compensation for rights reallocation is that they constitute a 
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narrow but steady stream of benefits to the recipient households, resembling the approach of 
punctuated compensation or rewards for environmental services. The regularity of the income 
allows recipients to plan use and investments better, levelling the playing field even for those 
initially disadvantaged to handle cash.  
A recent study by de Mel et al. (2012) suggested that also one-off cash grants may have 
lasting impacts. Nevertheless, their payments targeted solely micro-entrepreneurs − as the 
category of people who turned the Derema compensation to their advantage could be 
described – and positive impacts on profits and enterprise survival were only found among 
male participants. Despite equal access to financial capital, societal roles may dictate the kind 
of activities and investments available to men and women, as well as the time available for 
dedication to business activities.     
As suggested by Cernea’s point 6 (above), the cash compensation method leaves the 
responsibility over the use of the money to the recipients, not all of whom have the capacities 
and resources, including social and human capital, to utilize it in ways that would enhance the 
sustainability of their livelihoods.  It is the poorest that tend to have a very high marginal 
utility from immediate consumption, and high discount rates (Baird et al. 2009). Furthermore, 
if economists have failed to take into account the appreciation of resources and depreciation 
of compensation, or to assign asset values accurately in determining compensation (Cernea 
2003, above), local people may not be any more capable of considering the multiple relevant 
variables in order to determine their true long-term costs of accepting a one-off deal.  
Finally, it is not only individual questions of access and agency that affect the outcomes of 
displacement and compensation. The broader context of the conservation intervention (cf. 
Figure 2) largely determines the post-displacement economic opportunities for the affected. 
For the Derema farmers, non-farm opportunities were limited to casual labour on the tea 
estates, the labour demand of which was considered already saturated by migrant workers. In 
the areas surrounding the mountain forests, alternative land acquisition is similarly 
beleaguered by contested and overlapping land claims, with so far no explicit political 
backing for the resettlement of the Derema farmers (Study I). These broader linkages within 
and beyond the social-ecological system of the landscape are frequently ignored in narrow 
sector-specific planning of conservation interventions.   
The lessons from the Derema case, echoing previous literature on the social impacts of 
development-induced displacement, back suggestions that in addition to direct compensation, 
there is a need for other, timely and potentially long-term supportive measures for the 
rehabilitation of the livelihoods of the affected (Cernea 2003, Kanbur 2003), especially in the 
case of the poorest and most disadvantaged among the affected. Ex ante assessments should 
not only provide information on the distribution of likely social impacts of interventions, but 
also analyse the appropriate and feasible support measures for each identified stakeholder 
group in the current political economy context, with some projection of the foreseeable future 
included. The analysis of rights holders entitled to compensation and other support measures 
should be informed by an inclusive process and an understanding of the cultural factors 
influencing agency and access to resources by the different social groups to be affected. 
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Clearly, there is also a need to institutionalize systems that ensure that the findings of pre-
intervention assessments are effectively operationalized in conservation planning and 
implementation, instead of serving as an intervention legitimizing rubber stamp.    
Understanding the multiple socio-cultural and political economy ramifications of 
compensated displacement, the efficiency of direct payments for conservation may be seen in 
a different light. In estimating the costs of lost access due to conservation, economists have 
frequently only included the current monetary value of the resources (e.g. Kremen et al. 2000, 
Ferraro 2002) – as did the valuers in the Derema case, and as did those who determined the 
compensation in various failed development-related resettlement experiences (Cernea 2003). 
If exclusionary conservation interventions are to truly mitigate negative human impacts and 
marginalization of the poorest, and avoid strengthening existing inequalities, we need to add 
to the asset restitution costs the costs of comprehensive and inclusive planning processes, 
compensation for transaction costs, and long-term support to and monitoring of livelihood 
rehabilitation activities. The incorporation of these costs and adequate support measures will 
multiply the budgets needed for compensated displacement, and will probably make the cost-
effectiveness of the interventions appear differently on balance sheets.   
5.2.2. Community-Based Forest Management in the context of democratic 
decentralization 
If exclusionary, state-led approaches to tropical forest management have somewhat fallen out 
of favour in the contemporary conservation and development discourse, discursive and 
material support for community-based approaches remains strong. From 2002 to 2008, the 
area of forest under community management in the developing countries out of the 30 most 
forested countries in the world grew from 22% to 27% (Sunderlin et al. 2008, Larson and 
Dahal 2012). Numerous studies striving to identify the impacts of the advancing forest tenure 
reform have found a multitude of policies, goals, implementation strategies and outcomes 
under the label of ‘community management’ (Larson and Dahal 2012). In their seminal 
review of the state of the world’s forest tenure, White and Martin (2002) identified three main 
trends regarding the movement towards greater community tenure: increasing recognition of 
community forest ownership; allocation of management responsibility of public forest lands 
to communities; and securing greater community forest access through reforming public 
forest concessions.  
Among its various forms, it has been argued that only community forestry based on 
democratic decentralization has chances of succeeding in delivering the expected equity and 
effectiveness outcomes (Ribot et al. 2010). It is not surprising, then, that a bulk of studies has 
focused on documenting the Tanzanian Community-Based Forest Management experience, in 
which jurisdictional communities manage forests on community-owned land through 
ostensibly democratic processes. Results regarding the ecological effectiveness of Tanzanian 
CBFM have been largely positive (e.g. Persha and Blomley 2009, Blomley et al. 2010, 
Mbwambo et al. 2012). Ribot et al. (2010) attribute these results to the specific circumstances 
under which the Tanzanian CBFM performance has frequently been studied: in the context of 
areas and landscapes that have a history of high-intensity involvement and investment by 
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external actors through conservation and development projects, such as the Eastern Arc 
Mountains. This observation is also valid regarding studies on the livelihood benefits from 
CBFM, mostly concurring with the findings of the current study: benefits to communities and 
households are so far marginal, and both benefits and costs have been unevenly distributed 
within the communities (e.g. Meshack et al. 2006, Lund and Treue 2008, Vyamana 2009). In 
Study III, it was found that CBFM continues the East Usambaran ‘tradition’ of exclusionary 
conservation since colonial times, only this time on village land within the VFRs and 
implemented by the villagers. Study IV highlighted the role of both continued top-down 
influences by extra-communal actors as well as the power dynamics within the communities 
that work in favour of conservation-orientated management.    
The reasoning behind the suggestion that context and history play a determining role for the 
outcomes of theoretically progressive policies is captured in the idea of path-dependency. 
That is, previous established rules and power relations condition the formation of new 
regimes; “what was and what is shapes what can be” (Brockhaus and Angelsen 2012: 22, 
emphasis original). In institutional reproduction, involved actors have the power to mold 
institutions to serve particular interests, and inefficient and/or inequitable outcomes may 
continue following regime change, as long as they are supported by an elite group that reaps 
benefits (Mahoney 2000: 517). Actors, including organizations, frequently find ways of 
holding on to their old power bases despite purported changes in roles and responsibilities, 
such as the current advisory and supportive tasks assigned to district and central governments 
in the CBFM policy, as opposed to the previous regulatory role. This resistance to 
institutional change has been characterized as ‘stickiness’, particularly relevant in the case of 
actors that are powerful enough to hold back reforms (Brockhaus and Angelsen 2012). It has 
even been claimed that the motivations of state forestry agencies are so deeply ingrained in 
the prerogatives and associated benefit streams inherited from colonial regimes, that no 
amount of training in the principles of community forest management or efforts to change 
attitudes will lead to the needed structural changes (Dove 1995: 327, Li 2007: 280).   
What, then, are the means to break out of path-dependency – and what kinds of departures are 
even desirable to different actors in the case of CBFM in ‘conservation landscapes’ where the 
goals to protect global public goods collide with local livelihood needs? Li (2007) presents a 
persuasive analysis of practices of assemblage in community forestry. That is, diverse 
elements, discourses, institutions, actors and forms of expertise are brought together in 
varying ways to promote a certain solution, such as CBFM. Different actors assemble 
narratives of CBFM according to their conception of the problem – such as urgent needs to 
protect biodiversity, or a quest to restore ‘effective’ indigenous management of resources – 
and elements that do not fit that conception are dropped out of the narrative. This narrows 
down the analysis of the problem and subsequent proposals regarding the various forms that 
CBFM may take, filtered by power relations between the actors involved in planning and 
decision making (cf. Hajer 1993, 1995).    
There is a discursive hegemony regarding the need to create benefits from forest conservation 
to local communities among virtually all major forestry and conservation actors in Tanzania, 
but those striving to develop approaches combining CBFM with sustainable forest use are in 
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the minority (Rantala 2012). Among foresters, the prevailing vision of participatory forest 
management is that of reduced dependence on forests, not forests as a valuable livelihood 
asset (Blomley et al. 2010). In the particular context of the East Usambaras, timber extraction 
is likely to be a sensitive issue, almost a taboo, or considered too complicated to be integrated 
sustainably with conservation, due to the scandals related to commercial logging in the 1970-
80s and later illegal logging (Mwalubandu et al. 1991, Vihemäki 2009). Direct returns from 
most non-timber forest products are marginal compared to farming. Much hope is therefore 
placed in the potential of non-extractive activities that would sustain CBFM in the form of 
continued segregation of forests from human use, such as PES and REDD+. So far, such 
benefits have not materialized beyond pilot scale, and CBFM establishment, implementation 
and expansion is based on hopes of potential future benefits, conditional upon a global 
demand for the conservation services that the communities have to offer.   
A seeming ‘forest indifference’ of the majority of the village populations, on the one hand, 
and politically active cliques forming the critical mass for forest collective action, on the 
other, emerge as characterizing features of the East Usambaran CBFM regimes in this study. 
In order to understand the sustainability of these regimes in the current absence of broader 
incentives, it appears important to pay attention to two things: the motivation of the critical 
mass to continue sustaining forest collective action, and the legitimacy of this action by the 
village constituencies. 
This study found no evidence to suggest that the critical mass consisted of wealthier villagers 
better able to bear the transaction costs of CBFM because of a tangible benefit in sight (cf. 
Oliver et al. 1985, Baland and Platteau 2007). Rather, the costs associated with management 
currently outweigh the direct benefits. Instead, the incentives of the active group seem to be 
derived from political capital and social ties that are reinforced through active participation. 
The expectations of future benefits from current political and civic activity are not merely 
theoretical. For instance, experiences from the targeting of TASAF, Tanzania’s Social Action 
Fund, which funds community-driven development projects throughout the country, suggest 
that politically and civically active people have benefited disproportionally from the program. 
This applies to both the application-submitting communities as well as the distribution of 
beneficiaries within the communities (Baird et al. 2009). Enhanced access to information 
through existing ties to NGOs and government officials is likely to improve the position of 
politically and civically active villagers to benefit from new programs and emerging 
opportunities.  
The normative legitimacy of current CBFM action appears compromised by the quality of 
deliberation and representation in the decision and rule making processes, as well as the 
accountability measures practically available to the villagers, severely constrained by access 
to information. Study IV drew attention to the potential risks associated with contested 
legitimacies and coercive practices to compensate for legitimacy deficits in village forest 
regimes. A central reservation relates to the costliness of coercion; people’s expectations of 
the consequences of non-compliance require continuous and repetitive reinforcement (Swartz 
and Jordan 1980). This requires resources, which the village forest committees are currently 
struggling with (Study III). Furthermore, a continued focus on enforcing rules regarding the 
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reserved areas at the expense of attention to the surrounding land use matrix may lead to 
intensifying exploitation and relative forest product scarcity elsewhere, finally increasing 
pressures to exploit the reserves. Forest committees and guards are then easily outnumbered 
by potential users (cf. Li 2007).   
The two observations – the empowerment and potentially enhanced access to benefits by 
those who do participate, versus the political and civic apathy of the majority – seem to 
suggest that key to increasing equality of opportunities from CBFM and the gradual breaking 
out of inequitable regime paths is the general strengthening of human and social capital, with 
specific efforts directed at the marginalized strata of communities and the society. This is 
naturally a broader question than may be addressed within the forest sector or in the context 
of individual projects alone, but extremely relevant for the planning of new initiatives to 
reward local people for forest conservation. For example, the policy debate in Tanzania leans 
heavily towards communal rewards for REDD+ (Rantala 2012), and the current study has 
highlighted the associated risk of elite capture of such benefits. In general, the more value is 
added to a resource, the more likely it is to attract the interest of powerful actors. Thus, 
concerns that REDD+ might offer a significant incentive to recentralize forest governance 
(Phelps et al. 2010, Sandbrook et al. 2010, Larson 2011) or, in less obvious ways, increase the 
‘stickiness’ of government agencies in implementing democratic decentralization are probably 
not unjustified. Furthermore, if communities have been disadvantaged to benefit from their 
devolved forest rights because of inadequate powers (resources) to utilize forest resources 
(e.g. Ribot 2002), non-extractive benefits from forests may be even more elusive in being 
heavily dependent on access to expert knowledge on, for instance, carbon finance.  
It seems that there is no way around the issue of improved access to knowledge and education 
to truly democratize forest decision making, and to increase the legitimacy and equity of local 
forest-based initiatives. Conducive institutional structures for public participation and 
democratic governance, such as those associated with the Tanzanian local government, land 
and forest decentralization, remain ineffective as long as the majority of the population does 
not possess the capacities and resources to claim and exercise their procedural rights. But, as 
many forest conservation actors are aware (Li 2007), there is no guarantee that increasing 
democracy in community forestry will lead to ecologically optimal outcomes, which may 
make donors, conservationists and governments hesitant to fully commit to the idea of 
empowerment in democratic decentralization. As long as that is the case, the form of CBFM 
implementation and the subsequent balance of conservation and social benefits will always be 
determined outside of the forest adjacent communities, regardless of the rights defined by law 
and policy.  
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The current study offers several points for consideration in the planning of the ‘next wave’ of 
forest conservation instruments in Tanzania and potentially beyond. While in many ways the 
Derema case was an imperfect example to say definitely that personal payments for the taking 
of resource rights do not work, it did highlight some of the risks involved and critical factors 
for such schemes in the developing tropics. Defining rights to property and compensation in 
dynamic legal pluralist settings is complex. Outcomes are further conditioned by the 
structures and modalities of negotiating and claiming compensation, and the varying agency 
of different actors in these processes. Polycentric project settings, with unclear loci of 
responsibilities, make interventions susceptible to disruptions and delays in implementation, 
with the associated appreciation of resources and depreciation of compensation, impeding 
effective restitution of lost resources. Furthermore, the impacts of cash compensation on post-
displacement livelihood rehabilitation are sensitive to the capacities of recipients, and not the 
adequate form of compensation, especially as the sole method of compensation, in all cases. 
Addressing these issues seriously in order to achieve equitable mitigation of negative social 
impacts of displacement is likely to be resource intensive.   
The studies on the outcomes and processes of CBFM in the context of democratic 
decentralization may inform the planning of communal rewards for conservation services, 
such as those related to PES or REDD+. To enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of 
CBFM regimes, and to increase the equity of opportunities among local actors to benefit from 
them, the issues of deliberation, representation and accountability are central – at the 
community level as well as between levels of governance. Conducive institutional structures 
alone are not enough, but concerted efforts are needed to enhance people’s awareness of their 
procedural and substantive rights. This observation is obviously valid for governance 
processes involving all types of conservation interventions and opportunities to benefit from 
conservation and development in general.  
Can it be said which of the studied conservation approaches has the tendency to result in 
better social outcomes – or at least succeed better in mitigating harm? In the East Usambaran 
context, community-based processes, even if still influenced by external actors, appear to 
enjoy broader legitimacy among the concerned population than the large-scale land 
appropriations for conservation that have a rather bleak social track record. The impacts of 
CBFM have been more ‘democratic’, too, in that the negative livelihood impacts have been 
relatively minor compared to, for example, those of the Derema corridor establishment, and 
not concentrated on certain already disadvantaged groups. While shortcomings in the input 
legitimacy of CBFM processes were observed, the theoretical predispositions for broader 
participation and benefits are there in the building blocks of the policy, awaiting full 
harnessing of the opportunity.   
A key observation is that while the scope of the social impacts of CBFM has been narrower 
than that of the government protected areas, the ecological impacts of the two approaches – 
outside of the focus of the current study – are yet to be demonstrated. Ecological 
effectiveness, especially the attainment of biodiversity conservation goals in the current 
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context, will by default determine the viability of different conservation approaches at least as 
much as their social performance. A multi-faceted, cross-disciplinary evaluation may inform 
the identification of a suitable mix of policies for people and biodiversity. The practical 
combination and implementation of the policy mix should ideally be subjected to inclusive 
and equitable negotiation among all landscape stakeholders in order to achieve – if not win-
wins – more legitimate compromises. 
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